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Abstract
This paper presents evidence of how the shares of labour and capital costs and profi ts in the 
gross value added of corporate sectors of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the US varied 
between 1995 and 2016, and seeks to explain the differences between countries and how 
they have developed over time. The descriptive evidence does not support the hypothesis 
of a convergence in the composition of the countries’ corporate gross value added in the 
period, either within the euro area or between Europe and the US, nor is there evidence of 
a generalised downward trend in the share of labour costs over time. The parallel upward 
trend in the corporate profi t share of the US and Germany between 2000 and 2016 stands 
out, with German corporate profi t share consistently above that of the US. The evidence 
presented here supports the claim made by other studies that increasing corporate market 
power is the main driver of changes in the composition of gross value added over time in 
the case of the US. In the euro area countries, labour and capital shares are also sensitive to 
changes in the relative input prices of labour and capital (consistent with an inferred elasticity 
of substitution between labour and capital in production that is less than one, compared 
with the inferred value of one for the US). Finally, to explain the high and increasing German 
corporate profi t share, it is necessary to account for the sustained comparative production 
cost advantage of German corporations. 
Keywords: labour and capital cost shares; economic profi t shares; elasticity of substitution 
between labour and capital; market power; euro area countries and the US.
JEL classifi cation: E25; E22; O4.
Resumen
Este trabajo presenta evidencia de la participación del trabajo, del capital y de los benefi cios 
en el valor añadido de las empresas no fi nancieras de Francia, Alemania, Italia, España 
y Estados Unidos entre 1995 y 2016, tratando de explicar las diferencias entre países y 
su  evolución en el tiempo. No se encuentra evidencia de que la composición del valor 
añadido haya convergido en el área del euro o entre Europa y Estados Unidos ni tampoco 
hay evidencia de que la participación del trabajo haya disminuido de forma generalizada. 
Hay que resaltar la tendencia creciente de la participación de los benefi cios en Alemania 
y en Estados Unidos desde el año 2000, siendo superior esta magnitud en Alemania. La 
evidencia presentada apoya los resultados de otros estudios en cuanto a que el aumento 
en el poder de mercado es el principal determinante de los cambios en la composición del 
valor añadido en Estados Unidos. En el caso de los países del área del euro, los cambios 
en la participación del trabajo y del capital responden también a los cambios en los precios 
relativos de los inputs productivos (de forma consistente con una elasticidad de sustitución 
entre trabajo y capital menor que uno, comparada con la de Estados Unidos que es 
cercana a uno). Por último, para explicar el aumento de la participación de los benefi cios en 
Alemania, hay que considerar las mejoras continuadas de costes en términos comparativos 
de las empresas alemanas.
Palabras clave: participación del trabajo y del capital; participación de los benefi cios 
económicos; elasticidad de sustitución entre trabajo y capital; poder de mercado; países del 
área del euro y Estados Unidos.    
Códigos JEL: E25; E22; O4.
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1? Introduction 
The functional distribution of income, i.e. how the value added in the economy is divided up 
between the market compensation for labour and capital inputs and residual economic profits, 
has become an important research topic among economists in recent years. This interest is 
well justified, as the functional distribution of income has implications for competition policy (if 
economic profits are evidence of unchallenged market power), for economic growth (as capital 
investment will depend on the relationship between the cost of capital assets and their rate of 
return) and for income inequality (particularly if business owners receive all non-labour income, 
compensation of capital services and economic profits)1. 
This paper presents evidence regarding the aggregate shares of labour and capital 
cost and of economic profit in the value added of non-financial corporations in four euro- 
area countries (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) and in the US, over the period 1995-2016. 
Gross value added (GVA) is equal to the difference between the annual monetary value of 
goods and services produced by non-financial corporations in the domestic economy, and 
the annual monetary value of the intermediate inputs used in production, purchased from 
outside the domestic non-financial corporate sector. Gross value added and labour costs 
are reported directly by the National Accounts. Calculating the cost of capital services 
requires an ad hoc estimate of the stock of capital services used in production, and of the 
user cost of capital services. The residual economic profit, positive or negative, aggregated 
across the corporate sector, is simply the difference between GVA and the sum of the costs 
of labour and capital services.  
The paper addresses three main research questions: has the functional distribution of 
income in the corporate sectors of euro area countries converged since the launch of the single 
currency? How does the functional distribution of corporate value added in the euro area 
countries compare with that in the US? What factors (market power, economies of scale and 
elasticity of substitution of production technologies, national or global markets for goods and 
services) determine differences between countries’ functional distribution of income and how it 
has developed over time? Key features of the period of study (1995-2016) include membership 
of the euro by the European countries in the sample since 1999, the global spread of 
information and communication technologies, increasing globalisation of production and trade, 
and the impact of the Great Recession on all five economies in the study. This paper’s findings 
therefore offer some insights into how these factors common to all the corporate sectors 
considered could have interacted with distinctive national features to determine the GVA 
distribution observed. The inclusion of US corporate data for comparative purposes gives a 
more global dimension to the evidence reported here.  
The paper follows the approach recently taken in Barkai (2016), separating the non-
labour income of the gross value added of the corporate sector into cost of capital services 
and economic profits. The main focus of Barkai’s paper (2016) is to link developments in profit 
shares with changing corporate market power in the US. Our paper presents similar evidence 
on the progress of corporate profits in the largest euro area countries, and considers factors 
other than market power to be the drivers of the cross-country differences and time course of 
profit shares. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1?? See for example Zingales (2017) on the policy implications of evidence of firms’ increasing market power, especially in 
the US; Gutierrez and Philippon (2017) on the relative slowdown of capital investment in the recent economic recovery; 
and Piketty (2014) on the functional distribution of income and individual income inequality.   
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This paper therefore first outlines the properties of production technology under which 
developments in factor costs and profit shares can be unequivocally attributed to the 
progression of market power over time. And second, the paper examines the determinants of 
costs and profit shares in the context of a closed economy, where the relevant market for each 
corporate sector is domestic, and in the context of a global economy, where the national 
corporate sectors compete in a single relevant global market. In the latter case, differences in 
countries’ corporate profit shares will necessarily depend on differences in corporate 
production costs.  
Overall, the paper contributes to the literature in two ways. Firstly, with new empirical 
evidence on the aggregate composition of gross value added of corporate sectors in the main 
euro area economies and the US, with the specific new feature of the separation of non-labour 
income in capital costs and economic profit shares. And second, with a comprehensive 
conceptual framework that integrates properties of the production technology and of the 
definition of the relevant market, in explaining cross-country and trend differences in factor 
costs and profit shares. In particular, the paper clarifies the conditions under which changes in 
labour cost shares can be attributed solely to changes in firms’ market power, and highlights 
the relevance of comparative unit production costs in explaining the differences in corporate 
profit shares across countries in a single global market.   
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the most 
relevant literature on the changes over time in labour cost shares and the more recent literature 
on profit shares. In Section 3 we develop a conceptual accounting framework for the 
measurement of the underlying variables involved in the calculations of costs and profit shares. 
In Section 4 we describe the data sources for the different variables and Section 5 shows the 
results of the calculations of costs and profit shares. Section 6 presents a summary of the 
theoretical framework, expanded in Appendix 1, under which the empirical evidence is 
analysed. This analysis is reported in Section 7. Section 8 presents some robustness exercises 
using industry level data. Finally, Section 9 sets out the main conclusions. 
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2? Related literature 
The research contained in this paper is related to a relatively long list of research into the way in 
which labour cost shares have evolved in different countries over time, as well as to a few 
recent papers on trends in profit shares, and to the growing list of papers that use the evidence 
on changing cost and profit shares to assess worldwide trends in corporate market power.  
2.1 Labour cost share 
The early work of Keynes (1939), Kaldor (1957) and Solow (1958) documented the stability over 
time of the labour cost share in value added, particularly in the US, to the point that such 
stability became one of the universal laws in the explanation of the income distribution. 
However, more recent evidence has modified this view. Elsby et al. (2013) have examined the 
magnitude of the movements in the labour share in the US economy’s value added since 1948 
and found a decline of around 6 percentage points (pp) starting in the late 1980s and 
accelerating since the early 2000s. The drop in the overall labour share is due mostly to 
declines in the shares within particular industries, rather than to shifts in activity from higher to 
lower labour-intensive sectors. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) report a 5 pp average 
decline in the labour share of global corporate gross value added over the last 35 years, using 
data from 59 countries. This decline also occurred in each of the world’s eight largest 
economies, with the United Kingdom being the only exception, and, once again, it was 
explained by a decline in the share in particular industries across countries.   
Research into the stability (or not) of labour compensation in the functional distribution of income 
has continued with papers by Bridgman (2014), Rognlie (2015), Lawrence (2015), Koh et al. 
(2016), Barkai (2016), Kehrig and Vincent (2017) and Grossman et al. (2017), among others. The 
generally accepted conclusion of this body of research is that the change in the functional 
distribution of income has been a worldwide phenomenon and that it may have begun around the 
year 2000. However, a closer look at the results from the different papers reveals that their results 
are not always comparable, with divergences possibly arising out of methodological differences. 
For example, conclusions about the decline in labour cost shares over time depend on whether 
labour income is calculated for the whole economy or for the market economy (Estrada and 
Valdeolivas, 2012), or on whether labour costs include only compensation of employees, or also 
include self-employed individuals’ income (Elsby et al., 2013)2.  
Among those papers that conclude that the labour cost share has been declining over 
time, the most widespread explanation is the rising capital to labour ratio in the production of 
goods and services. One reason for this rise is the fall in the relative unit cost of capital, which 
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) attribute to the decrease over time in the purchase price of 
one unit of ICT capital, the kind of production equipment in which firms have invested most in 
recent years, and which Piketty (2014) attributes to the rise in aggregate savings around the 
world that depresses the expected rate of return on capital. However, if the quantities of labour 
and capital used in production are decided by profit maximising firms, for a lower relative cost 
of capital to translate into a smaller labour cost share the elasticity of substitution between 
capital and labour needs to be greater than one, which is not broadly supported by the 
empirical evidence. Oberfield and Raval (2015) explain the increase in capital intensity by the 
widespread adoption and use of production technologies biased towards capital. More recently 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2?? The conclusions are also sensitive to the use of gross or net value added, i.e. on whether the depreciation of 
productive capital is included in, or excluded from, value added (Bridgman, 2014, Rognlie, 2015). Including the income 
attributed to the owner occupied housing in the value added (or not) (Rognlie, 2015). And to the inclusion or not of the 
value of produced intangible assets in the estimated value of output produced in the economy (Koh et al., 2016).   
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Grossman et al. (2017) attribute the fall in the labour cost share to the slowdown in productivity 
growth that causes a deceleration of human capital accumulation in economies with 
production technologies that incorporate capital-skill complementarity (compatible with an 
elasticity of substitution between capital and labour lower than one).3 
2.2 Capital cost share and profits 
Within gross value added, non-labour income has tended to be considered, more or less 
explicitly, as capital income, without further distinction between capital cost and economic 
profits.  Barkai (2016) is the exception, with a study estimating the US corporate sector’s 
capital cost and the profit shares from 1985 to 2014. The capital cost share is calculated as 
the stock of corporate operating assets –measured as the non-residential fixed assets valued 
at current prices- per dollar of corporate gross value added, multiplied by the per unit user cost 
of capital (ex-ante nominal gross rate of return to compensate for the opportunity cost of the 
investment). He documents a decline of 7 pp in the capital share and a practically identical 
decline in the labour share (6.7 pp). This implies an increase of 13 p.p. in the economic profit 
share of US corporations over the last 30 years.  
Dobbs et al. (2015) report a significant increase in the accounting profits of firms relative to 
GDP worldwide from 1980 to 2013. Corporate earnings before interest and taxes rose from 7.6 
per cent of world GDP in 1980 to almost 10 per cent in 2013. Over the same period, worldwide 
net accounting profits, i.e. after interest on debt and taxes, as a proportion of GDP, increased 
even more. However, accounting profits are not the same as economic profits, as while 
accounting profits do not account for the opportunity cost of equity financing, economic profits 
account for the cost of both debt and equity. 
We are unaware of any studies estimating capital cost shares and profit shares for corporate 
sectors in countries other than the US. This paper is then the first to provide estimates of these 
shares for the euro area countries of France, Germany, Italy and Spain. One difficulty in the 
calculation of the capital cost share is that no official statistics exist on capital stock or on the 
per unit user cost of capital, so they have to be calculated ad hoc. To ensure the comparisons 
are uniform, we have replicated the calculation of capital stock and unit user cost for the US 
corporate sector using the same methodology.    
2.3 Market power 
Firms have market power if they can set the price at which their products sell on the market at 
above their marginal costs. Hall (1988) shows that the ratio of price over marginal cost (mark-
up ratio) can be empirically estimated as the  ratio between the elasticity of output to the 
variable input, and the share of the cost of the variable input over the total sales of the firm. 
Recently De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) estimate the Hall measure of market power with 
data from individual firms in the US over the period 1950-2014, with capital excluded from the 
variable inputs, and conclude that market power has been steadily increasing over time. Diez et 
al. (2018) and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2018) replicate the study with firm level data from 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3?? Other explanations, unrelated with our analysis, include: the increase in cheaper imported intermediate goods and 
offshoring activities (Elsby et al., 2013); the automation of tasks that were previously done by humans (Acemoglu and 
Restrepo, 2016); and the growing importance of “super star firms” (Author et al., 2017; Khering and Vincent, 2017).  
?
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numerous countries around the world over the period 1980-2016. The results of the two 
studies confirm the rise of market power worldwide but more clearly in developed countries.4 
Alternatively, Barkai (2016) measures market power in the US corporate sector 
directly from the economic profit share, therefore including capital among the variable 
production inputs and assuming constant returns to scale (marginal and average unit 
production costs coincide). Since the profit share increases over time so does market power. 
At the industry level, Barkai reports a strong positive correlation between market power and 
market concentration. 
Summing up, from the theoretical framework set out in Appendix A, an economy with 
labour as the only variable input and with a constant elasticity of output to the labour input, 
under Hall’s framework, the decline in the labour cost share would have to be attributed to 
increasing market power. Capital deepening could not be an explanation of the decrease in the 
labour cost share because the capital input is fixed, as is the cost attributed to the fixed input. 
With two or more variable inputs, for example intermediate products and labour, the condition 
for a constant elasticity of output to the labour input is true only if the production function is of 
the Cobb-Douglas type (elasticity of substitution between labour and intermediate inputs equal 
to one). With capital as a variable input together with labour and gross value added as the 
output variable, the falling labour and capital cost shares would necessarily be the 
consequence of increasing market power if the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs 
in the production function is equal to one. Also with labour and capital as variable inputs, 
Barkai’s economic profit share can be taken as a direct estimate of market power if the 
production function has constant returns to scale.   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
4?? Several papers (Gutiérrez and Philippon, 2017; Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2018; Traina, 2018; Hall, 2018) question 
the results of De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) for the US, particularly their choice of variable costs used as proxy of 
the marginal production cost. 
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3? Accounting 
Corporations are legal entities that own non-human capital assets, which they combine with 
labour and intermediate goods to produce goods and services to be sold on the market. In an 
earlier paper we were interested in measuring the contribution of the corporate sector to 
national income through the production of goods and services within national boundaries.5 
Here we are interested in how the aggregate value added produced by the corporate sector is 
divided into the cost of labour, the cost of capital and economic profits. Corporations with 
headquarters in one country can have subsidiaries producing goods or services abroad and 
therefore creating wealth in the host country. Our analysis excludes any wealth created abroad 
as our interest is in the allocation of the wealth created by the corporate sector within the 
national boundaries of a particular country. The activities of corporations not directly related to 
the production and sales of goods and services, such as investment in pure financial assets, 
are also excluded. 
Sectoral National Accounts publish the aggregate data on value added and the 
compensation of the labour input but do not report official information on the cost of capital. 
This is because corporations largely use capital input services from the assets they own 
(generally reported on their balance sheets), for which no reference market price is ready 
available, in the production of goods and services. In this situation it is common practice to 
divide corporations’ value added into labour and non-labour income. This practice, while 
avoiding questionable estimates of opportunity cost for the capital services from the capital 
assets owned by the firm, has the significant limitation that it does not separate non-labour 
income into capital costs and economic profits and, therefore, relevant information on 
corporate profits is not available.  
In this paper, we estimate the unit user cost of capital and the stock of operating 
capital for the five countries’ corporate sectors at replacement cost values. We then use these 
two variables to calculate the total opportunity cost of the capital services used in production. 
With the estimated cost of capital it is possible to separate the aggregate non-labour income 
into aggregate cost of capital and economic profits. In this section we explain the basics of the 
accounting for corporate economic profits applied in the paper.  
3.1 Income Accounting  
Excluding corporate subsidies and production taxes to simplify the notation, on an ex post 
basis, the aggregate gross value added (GVA) generated by the corporate sector during a time 
period t (generally one year) can be broken down into three terms: compensation for labour 
inputs, opportunity cost of capital and residual profits (positive or negative):             
 ???? ? ???? ? ??????? ? ?? ?????? ? ? ? ?  (1)??
The value of output produced, ??, at the unit price,???, is the notation we use to 
represent the gross value added with the primary inputs, ??? ? ????; where ?? is the cost 
per employee; ?? is the number of employees; ????? is the opportunity cost per unit of capital 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
5?? Salas et al. (2017) calculate that the contribution of NFCs’ GVA to national income (measured as GDP) in France, 
Germany, Italy, Spain and US in the period 1999-2015 ranged from 45% to 56%. The main cross-country differences 
arise from: i) the relative significance of self-employed business, classified within the household sector; and ii) for the 
case of the US, by not taking into account the non-corporate firms in the NFCs. Likewise, considering a broader 
measure of gross income with the inclusion of financial income, it is found that the weight of financial rents in NFCs 
total income is also heterogeneous across these countries. 
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services (equal to the user cost per monetary unit invested, ?? times the current purchase 
price per unit of capital services, ???), and ?? is the stock of units of capital services from past 
investments; the profit, ??, is a residual that can be positive or negative.6?
From equation (1) we obtain the labour cost share, ??? ?
????
????
, the capital cost share,     
??? ?
???????
????
 , and the ex-post share of economic profits, ???? ?
??
????
 . 
Sectoral National Accounts provide information on ??? and labor compensation, but 
not on the stock of capital and on the unit user cost of this capital. Hence for the calculation of 
capital costs and profit shares it will be necessary to estimate the unit user cost of capital, Rt, 
and the capital stock, ?????.  
3.2 The unit user cost of capital 
Incorporated firms report their activity via accounting statements such as their income 
statement (the flows of revenues and explicit costs of goods or services produced) and balance 
sheet (stock of assets and liabilities at a given moment of time). Generally accepted accounting 
practices for NFCs establish that only explicit costs can be used when calculating accounting 
profits. Opportunity costs are excluded and this particularly affects the opportunity cost of 
equity. Conversely, depreciation of capital assets and interest on debt are included among the 
costs of the business activity. One way to reconcile the accounting profits from conventional 
accounting statements with economic profits is to estimate an opportunity cost of equity and 
subtract it from the accounting profits. The limitation of this approach for the purposes of this 
paper is that it does not differentiate between the cost of operating capital assets, those 
consumed in the production of the gross value added, and the costs of all the NFCs’ operating 
and financial assets. 
In this paper we will depart from the corporate accounting practices and instead 
estimate values of the unit user cost of capital and of the stock of operating capital at 
replacement cost, for the corporate sectors of the five countries, France, Germany, Italy, Spain 
and the US. The per unit user cost of capital is an estimate of the ex-ante rate of return of 
capital invested demanded by investors to compensate for the return they would obtain 
investing in other alternatives with similar economic and financial risks. The unit user cost of 
capital is calculated as follows. 
At time t, the price of one unit of capital services is ??? and the expected rate of 
return on investing in another asset of equal risk is ??. One unit of capital service used in 
production will turn into ?? ? ??? units at the end of the period (depreciation rate ?? ). At time 
t, the expectation of the price of capital services at the end of the period is ????????. The ex-
ante user cost of capital is the rate of return, ??, which solves the following difference 
condition:7 
????????????????????????????? ? ?? ? ????????? ? ????? ? ??????
Writing????????? ? ????? ? ????????, where ??????? is the expectation in 
moment t of the rate of change in the price of capital services during that period up to t+1. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
6?? Including subsidies, SUt, and production taxes, PTt, the left-hand side of equation (1) would be modified to ptYt + SUt 
- PTt. In the empirical calculation subsidies and production taxes are properly accounted for.?
7?? See Hall and Jorgenson (1967).?
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Solving for???, we obtain the expression for the ex-ante user cost of capital per monetary unit 
of capital invested, 
                             ?? ? ? ?? ?  ??????? ? ??? ?? ? ????????                                            ?
The ex-ante user cost of capital per euro of current value of the capital asset is equal 
to the risk-adjusted nominal opportunity cost of each euro invested in the asset, at time t, ??, 
minus the expected the rate of change in the price of the capital assets up to time 
t+1,????????, plus the expected replacement cost of the assets depreciated in the 
period,????? ? ???????? ? ???. 
Corporations finance their assets with debt and equity. These two sources of finance 
have different effective costs because debt-holders and shareholders are exposed to different 
financial risks (debt-holders earn a pre-determined interest rate and shareholders a residual 
dividend) and interest on debt is tax-deductible, as are depreciation costs, whereas the cost of 
equity is not. Taking these differences into account the pre-tax user cost of capital (???) per 
monetary unit invested in productive capital, financed with proportions of debt and equity b and 
?? ? ??, is equal to:8 
 ??? ? ???????? ? ??? ? ?? ? ????? ? ?? ? ????????
??????
????
                (2)
  
Where is the rate of interest on debt; ???is the rate of return expected by the 
shareholders, i.e. the financial opportunity cost of equity;  is the legal tax rate on corporate 
profits; and ???is the net present value of tax-deductible capital depreciation allowances per 
unit of capital.9 The details of the sources of data used in the calculation of the unit user cost of 
capital are presented in Appendix B.  
3.3 Capital stock and total user cost 
Firms invest in new capital assets over time. The new investment replaces the capital assets 
consumed or depreciated in each period and may contribute to expanding production capacity. 
If market purchase prices of capital assets fluctuate over time and/or the technological progress 
incorporated into the new capital goods accelerates the economic depreciation of past invested 
assets, the monetary value of the stock of capital assets at a given moment in time will, unless 
properly adjusted, be an aggregation of assets valued at different acquisition prices and with 
different technological characteristics. Calculating the opportunity cost of capital requires that all 
operating assets be valued at current replacement cost, which in general will be different from 
the acquisition cost of capital assets on the balance sheets.  
Assuming that the technological obsolescence of any existing capital assets is 
included in , to save on notation, the stock of units of capital services at the end of period t 
for a firm that invests  units of new capital during that period is given by: 
it
b
t?
?
tI
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8?? As discussed below, we consider the time varying funding structure of NFCs, according to the breakdown of liabilities 
into debt and equity over time as reported in the Financial Accounts of this institutional sector. This enables us to 
better capture the changing nature of the funding structure of the NFCs, their average funding cost and, therefore, the 
implications for the user cost of capital.?
9?? In the calculation of the net present value of capital depreciation allowances we take into account the breakdown of 
nominal gross-fixed capital formation into three types of investment (non-residential buildings, equipment and 
intangibles) with different allowance schedules.?
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?? ? ?????? ? ??? ? ???
The stock of capital services and the investment in new assets are reported in 
monetary values. If ?????? ??? are, respectively, the prices per unit of capital services in period 
t-1 and in period t, the current replacement cost of capital services can be expressed as, 
????? ? ??????????? ? ???
???
?????
? ?????         (3) 
The replacement cost of capital services at the end of a given period is equal to the 
stock of capital services at the end of the previous period, net of depreciation, valued at current 
replacement prices, plus the new gross investment in capital services during the period at 
current prices. 
The pre-tax total cost of capital services in period t is equal to the pre-tax user cost of 
capital in (2), multiplied the stock of capital at current replacement cost in (3), i.e. ????????. 
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4? Variables and data sources  
For the organisation and collection of the data used in the calculation of cost and profit shares 
we have considered a simplified income statement and balance sheet for the consolidated 
corporate sector of each country as follows: 
Income statement (the variables actually measured are in bold type) 
Revenues from products and services sold 
+Subsidies 
-Production taxes 
-Cost of the intermediate production inputs purchased outside the corporate sector 
=Gross value added 
-Cost of labour input 
-Cost of capital input 
=Economic profits 
Balance Sheet: 
????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
? ???????
?
The measurement of the variables on the income statement and balance sheet will 
involve data from several sources: the Sectoral National Accounts for the Non-Financial Corporate 
Sector, NFCs (flow variables); NFCs’ Financial Accounts (stock data); the KLEMS database (initial 
depreciation rate and investment price-deflators); Central Bank statistics on prices and returns on 
financial assets; and OECD data on corporate income tax rates and on the net present value of 
depreciation allowances for each type of capital good (non-residential buildings and structures, 
equipment goods and intangible assets). For the four euro-area countries the Sectoral and 
Financial Accounts data are taken from the harmonised Eurostat statistics database, while for the 
US corporate sector the data source is the BEA statistics database. The definition of non-financial 
corporations is different in the BEA than in the Eurostat statistics (see note 5).  
The Sectoral National Accounts provide data on flow variables: value of production, cost 
of intermediate inputs, labour compensation, production and import taxes and corporate 
subsidies, consumption of fixed capital (depreciation) and capital investment flows. From this data 
source we can therefore directly obtain information on gross value added, and on the cost of 
labour inputs on the income statement. The cost of capital income is not readily available and has 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 17 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1833
to be estimated. For this purpose we need an estimate of the stock of operating capital valued at 
replacement cost,?????? and an estimate of the user cost of capital per euro/dollar invested, ??.  
4.1 The estimated capital stock  
The stock of capital assets for the corporate sector of each of the five countries at the end of 
year t, over the period from 1995 to 2016, has been calculated using the perpetual inventory 
method (simplified version of equation (3)): 
   ????? ? ????????? ? ???? ? ??????
The term ???? is the nominal depreciation flow reported in the National Accounts, 
aggregated for the NFCs of the respective country in year t (calculated from assets at current 
replacement cost and assumed to be a good estimate of economic depreciation), and ??????is 
the flow of nominal expenditures in gross capital formation of the NFCs in year t.10 
The capital stock of year 0 (1994) is not available so has to be estimated. The 
observed depreciation flow in year 1995 will be given by ??????? ? ????????????????. 
Thus, from this expression,  
??????????? ?
???????
?????
?
We still need the initial depreciation rate for the year 1995 (?????). To calculate this 
depreciation rate we used data from the KLEMS database on the composition of capital stocks 
(machinery, equipment, non-residential buildings and structures, and intellectual property 
products), and on the depreciation rates of each asset class, across 2-digit economic sectors 
of the respective country. The estimated depreciation rate for each corporate sector will 
therefore be the sum of depreciation rates of individual assets weighted by the share of the 
asset class in the country’s total assets. The resulting depreciation rates for 1995 are: 8.6% for 
France, 8% for Germany, 6.8% for Italy, 6.5% for Spain and 8% for the US.  
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 shows the estimated ratios of capital stock to gross 
value added.11 The ratios increase over time for the corporate sectors of Spain and Italy (until 
2013), stay relatively stable in the corporate sectors of US and France and decrease in the 
German corporate sector. The differences across corporate sectors in capital to output ratios 
are considerable.  For example, in 2016 the ratios were 2.5 in Italy, 2.8 in Spain, close to 2 in 
France and Germany and 1.7 in the US.12 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10??Gross capital formation is the sum of gross fixed capital formation, changes in inventories and net acquisitions of non-
financial non-produced assets. The KLEMS database provides estimates of the stock of capital in the economies 
represented in this paper but we prefer to calculate our own estimates because this way we can use investment and 
depreciation data that National Accounts attribute specifically to the NFC sector.?
11??Annual data on these two variables as well as on labour costs, gross investment, depreciation and the investment 
deflator for the corporate sectors of the five countries is included in Data Appendix.?
12??We compared with alternative measures of capital stock, which are not represented here. For example, our measure of 
capital stock of the NFC sectors in our countries of interest shares generally similar trends to those obtained 
aggregating data by activity branch and type of asset from KLEMS. In terms of levels, our measure of capital stock is, 
on average over the period 1995-2016, higher than that estimated with KLEMS data in the cases of France, Spain 
(both around 15%) and Germany (10%), while it is lower in the US (almost 20%) and Italy (about 5%). It should be 
noted that our selected measure of capital stock for the US nonfinancial corporations is very close to non-residential 
fixed assets data from BEA, which was used by Barkai (2016) and, in the case of Germany, it does not have the 
sizeable underestimation problem that other statistics like Financial Accounts do (taking the difference between its 
liabilities and financial assets as a measure of capital stock for the NFC sector).?
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Figure 1. Capital Stock over GVA, 
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4.2 The unit user cost of capital 
In what follows, we report the results of the calculation of the pre-tax and per unit user cost of 
capital as given in equation (2) above. A more detailed explanation of the data sources and 
values of individual variables can be found in Appendix B.  
The real financial opportunity cost component of the user cost of capital is equal to the 
weighted average of the opportunity cost of debt and the opportunity cost of equity, where the 
weights are the respective proportions of debt and equity on the balance sheet of the 
corporate sector, minus the expected inflation rate for the prices of capital goods:  
??? ? ????? ? ?? ? ????? ? ????????
Figure 2 shows the estimated real financial opportunity costs for the corporate sectors 
of the five countries.13 
  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
13? The country level data on the cost of debt ???, the debt-to-total capital stock ratio, bt, the cost of equity ??, the 
expected inflation rate in the prices of capital goods ????????as well as on the depreciation rate ?? is  available in Data 
Appendix.?
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Figure 2. Real Financial Cost of Capital, ??? (%) 
?
In 1999, the year of the creation of the euro, the real financial cost of capital was 
around 6% for the four euro-area countries and the US. The higher price inflation of capital 
goods in Italy, France and Spain than in Germany and the US, explains why during the period 
2000-2008 the real financial cost of capital in the European countries was lower than in the US. 
In the final years of the sample period, 2010-2016, the real financial cost of capital steadily 
decreased in Germany, to a low of 1.1% in 2016. French corporations’ financial cost of capital 
has been relatively stable since the creation of the euro and the same is true for the Italian and 
US corporate sectors (an average of 4%). The financial cost of capital of Spanish corporations 
fell to a low of 3% in 2006 and rose during the crisis to a peak of 7.1% in 2012. Since 2013, 
coinciding with the years of monetary expansion by the ECB, borrowing costs have been 
decreasing but in 2016 are still higher than in other corporate sectors.  
The pre-tax user cost of capital is defined in equation (2). The calculation involves the 
real financial cost of capital shown in Figure 2, the depreciation rate, and the tax adjustment 
due to the fact that capital depreciation and interest on debt are tax-deductible in the 
calculation of taxable corporate profits. The estimated pre-tax user costs of capital of the 
corporate sectors of the five countries are shown in Figure 3.14 
? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
14? In general, the most significant factors explaining the fall of the unit user cost of capital during the sample period 
across countries were the funding costs (both, equity and debt). By contrast, corporate tax variables and expected 
inflation made a marginal contribution. See Appendix B and Data Appendix.??
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Figure 3. Pre-tax User Cost of Capital, ??? (%) 
?
The user cost of capital differs across countries because of differences in the financial 
cost (Figure 2) depreciation rates, and tax variables. Average depreciation rates over the 
sample period were 9.6% for France, 8.2% for Germany, 8.1% for Italy, 7.0% for Spain, and 
9.0% for the US. The difference between pre-tax and after-tax user cost of capital ranges from 
1.7 pp in the US corporate sector –the highest– to 0.9 pp in France –the lowest. In the cases of 
Germany, Italy and Spain the differences are all close to 1.1 pp. Therefore, the main reason 
why the pre-tax user cost of capital of Spanish corporations was lower than that of their 
German counterparts between 2000 and 2010 was the lower depreciation rate for corporate 
assets in Spain than in Germany. The differences in depreciation rates also explain why the 
pre-tax user cost of capital of French and US corporations, around 15.5% in the sample 
period, is, on average, almost 2 pp higher than the pre-tax user cost of capital of German and 
Spanish corporations, and 1.5 pp higher than that of Italian firms. 
The downward trend in the unit user cost of capital for the Spanish and Italian 
corporate sectors in the first ten years of the euro reflects the downward trend in borrowing 
costs after joining the single currency area. From 2010 onwards, Germany had by far the 
lowest user cost of capital, again explained by German corporations’ lower borrowing costs in 
this period. 
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5? The shares of input costs and profits: trends and convergence  
This section presents the results of the calculations of the input cost shares and the residual 
profit share for the corporate sectors of the five countries over the period 1995-2016.15 
The labour cost shares values, i.e. the ratio of labour costs to gross value added are 
shown in Figure 4. In the mid-nineties, the labour cost shares of non-financial corporations 
clustered around 65% in four of the five countries; in the fifth country, Italy, the share was less 
than 50%. Since then, corporate cost shares diverged among the countries in the sample in 
the pre-crisis and crisis periods. In particular, over the period 1995-2007 the labour cost share 
in the German corporate sector fell by 10 pp, from 63% to 53%; it then rose again to stabilise 
around 59% in the final years of the sample period. In the Spanish corporate sector, the labour 
cost share went in exactly the opposite direction, first increasing in the pre-crisis period and 
later decreasing. The labour cost share in the French corporate sector held stable over time 
with values around 67%, while in the Italian corporate sector the labour cost share increased 
up until 2009 and stabilised thereafter at values closer to those of Germany and Spain (around 
57%). Finally, in the US corporate sector the labour share first rose to a maximum of 71% in 
2001 and then declined to stabilise around 65% from 2010 onwards.   
Figure 4. Labour Cost Share relative to GVA, 
????
????
 (%) 
The next piece of evidence is on the capital cost share, i.e. the ratio of the imputed 
total user cost of capital to the GVA of the respective corporate sector (Figure 5).  
  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15??The annual country level values of the cost and profit shares variables is available in the Data Appendix.?
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Figure 5. Capital Cost Share relative to GVA, 
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From 1995 until 1999, when the countries joined the euro, the capital cost shares of 
NFCs in Italy and Spain were on a downward trend starting from divergent values of around 
50% to reach values around 30%, close to the capital costs shares of corporations in France, 
Germany and the US. In the years 1999-2009 the capital shares held fairly stable across 
countries, with modest declines in Germany, Spain and the US and moderate increases in 
France and Italy (ranging between 1 pp and 3 pp in absolute values). With the crisis the per unit 
user cost of capital and the ratio of capital to gross value added diverged across countries, as 
did the capital cost shares.  
Of particular note is the stability of the capital cost share of the French corporate 
sector throughout the sample period. This contrasts with the steady decline in the capital cost 
share of the German corporate sector since the introduction of the euro, from a high of 37% in 
2000 to a low close to 21% in 2016. Over the same period, the capital share of US 
corporations only decreased by less than 4 pp. In 2016, the capital cost share of Spanish 
corporations was still 14 pp higher than that of German corporations. 
The profit share is equal to economic profits divided by gross value added. It is also 
equal to the difference from one of the sum of the labour and capital cost shares. The results of 
the calculations are shown in Figure 6.   
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Since 2000, the profit shares have been on an upward trend in the German and US 
NFCs, although values in Germany have been consistently higher than those in the US: in 
2016, German corporations’ profit share was 20%, more than twice that of US corporations. In 
the pre-euro years, Italian corporations increased their profit share from negative values at the 
beginning of the sample period to almost 20% in 2000. In the years from 2000 to 2012, the 
profit share of Italian corporations decreased steadily to a low of 2%; from 2013, the profit 
shares increased again, reaching a value of 9% in 2016.  
The trends in Spanish and Italian corporations’ profit shares initially paralleled one 
another, but in the period 2000-2009 the two diverged and the Spanish profit share reached a 
maximum of 10% in 2009 (the main adjustment of the real sector of the economy to the crisis 
took place in the years 2010-2013). The sharp increase in the user cost of capital in 2009-
2012, together with the inertia in the capital intensity ratio, resulted in Spanish corporations 
having a slightly negative profit share in 2012. Since then, the profit share of Spanish 
corporations has trended positively, rising to 7.5% of GVA in 2016. On average for the sample 
period as a whole, the NFCs’ profit shares were 2.4% in France, 12.2% in Germany, 10.3% in 
Italy, 4.1% in Spain and 5.4% in the US. The difference in German and US corporations’ profit 
shares has been relatively stable over time, except in the final years when the profit share of 
German corporations increased sharply to 20%, while the profit share of US corporations 
remained stable at around 10%.  
Figure 7 summarises the five countries’ distribution of corporate sectors’ GVA into 
labour and capital cost inputs, and profit shares. France is the country where NFCs have 
normally had the lowest profit share, while profit shares of German NFCs have been 
traditionally the highest. In general, the profit share tended to move in the opposite direction to 
that of the capital cost share, with the exception of Italy where the labour share also shrank 
over time. Italy and Spain are the countries whose corporate sectors seemed to benefit the 
most in terms of higher profits from the reduction in the financing costs of capital thanks to the 
euro, particularly during the years 2000-2007.  
The descriptive information presented so far indicates substantial differences in the 
composition of corporate sector GVA across countries. These differences persist over time, 
although how one corporate sector compares with the rest depends on whether the 
comparison is made in the pre-crisis or crisis years.  
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Figure 7. Cost and Profit Shares relative to GVA (%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As regards the question of the convergence of the labour cost shares of the corporate 
sectors in the euro area, the empirical evidence in Figure 4 shows permanent divergences in at 
least one country. In the first few years of the sample period, the labour cost share clustered 
around 65% of gross value added in all corporate sectors except Italy’s, where the labour cost 
share is less than 50%. In the early years of the euro, up until 2007, the labour cost share 
decreased in the German corporate sector by almost 9 pp, remained stable in the French and 
Spanish corporate sectors and increased in the Italian corporate sector. During the crisis the 
share decreased in the Spanish corporate sector and increased in Germany’s, such that in 
2016 the labour cost shares of the corporate sectors of Germany, Italy and Spain clustered 
around the value of 58%, while in the French corporate sector the labour cost share was 67%. 
The labour cost share of the US corporate sector is higher than the corporate sector’s share in 
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any of the euro area countries in the sample, except France’s. During the crisis the difference in 
the labour cost shares of corporations in the US and Germany stabilised around 5-6 pp.  
Figure 4 shows no evidence of a decreasing trend in the labour shares of the euro 
area countries. In the US corporate sector the share has been stable since 2010. Hence, the 
evidence does not support the generally accepted view of a decreasing time trend in labour 
cost shares across developed countries. However, when comparing our results with others in 
the literature a number of points should be borne in mind: the evidence reported here includes 
only four countries; it refers to the aggregate corporate sector, not to the whole economy; the 
labour share is calculated relative to gross value added and excludes the value of produced 
intangible assets; and the study covers a shorter period of time than other studies.  
In the years prior to the euro, the capital cost shares converge between countries to a 
value around 30% of gross value added (Figure 5). This convergence continued until the onset 
of the crisis in 2008 and since then the situation has been one of clear divergence. The German 
corporate sector, where the capital cost share decreased steadily from 2008 until 2016 
(11 pp), accounts for a large portion of this divergence. The capital cost share of the US 
corporate sector remained close to 30% until 2001 and subsequently declined (4 pp lower cost 
share in 2016 than in 2001) although not so markedly as the decline in capital cost share of 
German corporations.    
The cross-country divergence in profit shares (Figure 6) is more evident than that in 
cost shares, although the differences between corporate sectors vary depending on the point 
in time. Of particular relevance is the upward trend in the profit shares of the German and the 
US corporate sectors since the year 2000, with Germany’s share approximately 7 pp higher 
than the US’s.  
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6? Theoretical background  
A more detailed explanation of the theory framework from which we examine and interpret the 
empirical evidence is presented in the Appendix A. This section summarises the main theoretical 
predictions that guide the analysis of the empirical evidence given in the following section.  
For a profit-maximising firm with two variable inputs, labour and capital, and one 
output sold on a market with price inelastic demand, the costs and profit shares, with variables 
evaluated at optimum values, are determined as follows: 
                ????
????
? ????????                          (4) 
                                               
???????
????
? ????????                                     (5) 
                                                
??
????
? ?? ? ????                                               (6) 
??????? ???????are the elasticity of output Y to the labour L and capital K inputs, 
respectively. They satisfy the condition ? ? ?????? ? ??????where ? is a parameter that 
measures the returns to scale in the production function, constant (? ? ??, increasing ?? ? ?? 
or decreasing ?? ? ?? returns. For the CES production function, (see (A4)-(A6) in the appendix) 
the elasticity of output to the labour input is given by:  
                                              ?????? ?
?
??????? ?
?
???????????
?
?
???
                         (7) 
Where a is a positive parameter of the relative technological labour intensity in the 
production function, and ?>-1, is a parameter related to the elasticity of substitution ? ? ?
???
. 
The variable ? ? ?? ? ? is an inverse measure of market power, 
?
??
? ??
???
, the ratio of 
price ??to marginal cost ???. Equations (4) to (6) may refer to an individual firm, to a market 
with more than one firm or to the whole economy with many different markets. Market and 
economy levels of costs and profit shares are the weighted averages of costs, and profit shares 
of individual firms, where the weights are the share of the value added of the particular firm in 
the total value added of the respective market or the total economy. The value of the ratio of 
price to marginal cost will vary across countries or within countries over time depending on 
market structure variables and competition conditions. For example, for a single firm j facing a 
residual demand for its products with constant price elasticity ?? ? ? in absolute value, in the 
profit maximising output ?? ?
????
??
.  
If the firm behaves as a price taker then the price elasticity is equal to infinity and the 
market power parameter is equal to 1 (price equal to marginal cost). If the economy is a single 
market with a homogeneous product and firms compete à la Nash-Cournot, at equilibrium ? ?
???
?
, where ? is the price elasticity of market demand for the homogeneous product in 
absolute value, and H is the Herfindahl concentration measure. In this case, market power 
?
?
 
decreases with the price elasticity of demand and increases with market concentration. 
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Papers such as that by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) focusing on the labour cost 
share implicitly assume absence of market power, ??=1, and the labor cost share is 
determined only by the elasticity of output to the labour input in the production function. From 
(7) when the elasticity of substitution is equal to 1, i.e., ?=0, then the elasticity ??????  is 
constant and equal to ?? (“iron law” of income distribution). When ? is non-zero the value of 
the elasticity of substitution, greater than or less than one, determines the sign of the variation 
in the labour cost share relative to changes in relative input prices.  
On the other hand, papers inspired by Hall (1988) that estimate market power as 
?
??
?
??????
????
????
 (when the labour input is the only variable input) assume that the elasticity of output 
to labour is constant and market power evolves in a way totally determined by changes in the 
ratio of sales to variable costs (labour costs in this case). This will be true only if the elasticity of 
substitution between labour and other variable inputs is equal to one.  
From (6), with the implicit assumption that capital is also a variable input, the measure 
of market power as a function of the profit share, is given by 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?
??
? ?
?? ??????
???????????????????????    (8) 
Barkai (2016) assumes ? ? ? and estimates the evolution of market power in the US 
corporate sector as a function of the profit share alone.  
So far, the corporate sectors of the national economies have been assumed to 
operate in a closed economy. The elasticity of demand and the market concentration that 
structurally determine simultaneously the market power and the profit shares, refer to the 
respective national economy. If the national economies are open and the national corporate 
sectors compete in a single global market, then, at market equilibrium, homogeneous products 
from different corporate sectors will all sell at the same price (???. Therefore, differences in 
profit shares of the corporate sectors between countries will be determined by differences in 
unit costs. For country i, 
                                                 
???
?????
? ???????
??
                                            (9) 
Where the average unit cost ???? is given by:????? ?
?????????????????
???
?
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7?  Analysis of the empirical evidence 
The theory suggests that if firms are profit maximisers, differences in cost and profit shares 
between countries and trends within countries over time, will be determined by differences and 
changes in the characteristics of the production technology (elasticity of substitution among 
labour inputs, degree of economies of scale, intrinsic capital intensity), of the product market 
(price elasticity of demand, concentration, geographic scope, i.e. domestic or global market). 
This section aims to interpret the empirical results from the calculations of costs and profit 
shares under these theoretical predictions. To do so, it will be necessary to make some 
inferences from the data as to the plausible values of the elasticity of substitution between 
labour and capital, and of the economies of scale in production, because the values of these 
parameters will determine the validity of one explanation of the results or another.  
7.1 Evidence regarding the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital 
Combining equations (4), (5) and (7) above the ratio of labour to capital costs is given by: 
????????????????????? 
????
???????
? ? ?
???
?
?
??? ? ??
?????
?
?
???
                          (10)?
The ratio between labour costs and capital costs is independent of the returns to scale, 
?, and of market power ?. Changes in relative input unit prices will affect the ratio of inputs’ total 
costs depending on the value of the parameter ?. If the empirical evidence indicates that the ratio 
of inputs’ costs is uncorrelated with relative input prices then it can be reasonably accepted that 
? ? ?, i.e. elasticity of substitution between labor and capital equal to one, ? ? ? (Cobb-
Douglas production function). Positive (negative) and significant correlation between cost shares 
and relative input prices will indicate that ? is positive (negative) and that the elasticity of 
substitution between labor and capital is less (greater) than one.  
Figure 8 shows the ratios of labour over capital costs for the NFCs of the five countries 
compared. The US corporate sector has the highest labour to capital costs ratio throughout 
the sample period, remaining practically constant over time at around 2.5. The corporate 
sector with the lowest ratio is Italy’s, with a value around 1.5, which has been stable since 
1998. The cost ratio of the French corporate sector remained close to the cost ratio of the US 
corporate sector, although somewhat lower and more volatile. In the case of Germany, the 
cost ratio first decreased, in the pre-euro years, then stayed stable around a value of 1.7 in the 
period 2000-2008, after which it again rose, up to a value of 2.8 in 2016, which was higher 
than that in the US. In the Spanish corporate sector the ratio of labour to capital costs 
increased from 1.3 in 1995 to 2.2 in 2007 after which it experienced a significant decline until it 
stabilised at around 1.5 at the end of the sample period, close to the values observed for the 
Italian corporate sector’s ratio.16  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
16??The higher volatility in Spain’s ratio may be related to the particular characteristics of its labour market with significant 
employment and unit labour cost changes over the business cycles.?
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1833
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15
France Germany Italy Spain US
80
120
160
200
240
95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09 11 13 15
France Germany Italy Spain US
Figure 8. The Ratios of Labour over Capital Costs, 
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Figure 9. Relative Input Prices, 
??
?????
 (1995=100) 
 
The relative unit input unit prices for each corporate sector are shown in Figure 9.17 In 
Germany, the ratio of input prices remained relatively stable with practically no time trend from 
the first year of the sample period to the year 2008. From 2009 onwards the price per unit of 
labour relative to that of capital followed an upward trend and in 2016 it was 50% higher than 
in 2008. In France, the upward trend in the ratio of input prices seen in the previous years 
accelerated during the crisis. Even so, in 2016 the cost ratio of the French corporate sector 
was 15 units lower than that of the German corporate sector. In the US the ratio of unit labour 
to capital prices rose steadily throughout the sample period and in 2016 was 1.6 times the ratio 
in 1995, close to the ratio of the German corporate sector.  
Spain and Italy are the countries where the ratio of unit input prices increased most 
during the sample period, although the pattern of growth differed in each case. In Italy, the ratio 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
17??For each country, wages are measured as compensation of employees of the NFC sector as a whole reported in 
National Accounts divided by full-time equivalent (FTE) employees constructed specifically for this sector aggregating 
FTE employees from activity branches typical of NFCs. The number of FTE employees for the European countries is 
constructed from the EU Labour Force Survey data available on Eurostat. Data for the US are available on BEA (NIPA 
Tables, Section 6 – Income and employment by industry). For each activity branch and year, the number of FTE 
employees is equal to the number of total employees multiplied by the average number of actual weekly hours for total 
employees and divided by the average number of actual weekly hours for full-time employees. Total employees include 
full- and part-time employees.?
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of input prices rose by around 80% between 1995 and 1999, since when it has remained 
relatively stable. In Spain, the ratio followed an upward trend from 1995 until 2009 when it 
reached its maximum value of 2.3 times the value of the ratio in 1995. After 2009, the ratio first 
declined and then rose again in the final years of the sample period up to a value close to that 
in 2009. This pattern can be viewed as a reflection of the greater volatility of the business cycle 
of the Spanish economy, in comparison with the volatility of the other economies in the sample.  
Figure 9 shows that the ratio of input prices increases over time in the US, while Figure 
8 shows how the ratio of labour and capital costs there remained stable. This suggests that the 
value of ? implicit in the US corporate sector data will be close to zero, i.e. the inferred elasticity 
of substitution ? will be close to one. In Germany and Italy, on the other hand, the visual 
comparison of the time course of cost ratios (Figure 8) and unit price ratios (Figure 9) suggests 
a high correlation between the two variables. France and Spain are in between.  
Figure 10. The Relationship between Relative Cost Shares (y axis, logs and differences 
from sample means) and Relative Input Prices (x axis, logs and differences from 
sample means) 
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Figure 10 shows estimates of the coefficient of a linear regression model resulting from taking 
logs of both sides of equation (10). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the cost shares 
(in terms of differences from the sample mean), and the explanatory variable is the log of the 
ratio of unit prices of labour to capital (also in differences with respect to the sample mean). The 
regression coefficient of the explanatory variable is equal to? ?
?????
. According to the results 
shown in the Figure, the estimated coefficient is practically zero for the US corporate sector, 
and close to one, (0.94) for the Italian corporate sector. Between these extremes, the 
estimated coefficients are 0.26 for France, 0.33 for Spain and 0.73 for Germany.18 
From the estimated coefficient ? of the explanatory variable in Figure 10 we calculate 
the implicit value of ?, i.e. ?=?/(1-?) and the elasticity of substitution inferred from the 
aggregate data, ?=1/(1+?)=1-?. The resulting estimated elasticity of substitution values are 
reported in the first row of Table 1. The values of the second row are obtained by repeating the 
estimation with data limited to the years since the launch of the euro, i.e. 1999-2016. The 
inferred elasticity of substitution is close to one for the US corporate sector and zero for Italy’s. 
For the other countries’ corporate sectors the inferred values of the elasticity of substitution are 
0.74 for France, 0.67 for Spain and much lower, 0.27, for Germany.  
Table 1: Estimates of the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital (? ? ?
???
) 
?? France Germany Italy Spain US 
1995-2016 0.740*** 0.270*** 0.059 0.674*** 0.983*** 
1999-2016 0.834*** 0.166** 0.128 0.887*** 0.991*** 
*** Indicates significant at 1%, and ** at 5%. ?? ?? ??
 
An estimated elasticity of substitution equal to one for the US corporate sector means 
that relative quantities of labour and capital inputs adjust in similar proportions – but with the 
opposite sign – to changes in relative prices such that the ratio of cost shares remains 
unchanged. On the other hand, an estimated elasticity of substitution of zero for Italy means 
that in this economy relative input quantities remain unchanged in response to changes in the 
relative prices of inputs; therefore, in the Italian corporate sector the ratio of cost shares closely 
tracks changes in the ratio of unit prices to labour and capital inputs.19 
7.2 Economies of scale and market power 
According to equation (8) the estimated mark-up depends on the economies of scale in 
production ? and on the profit share. Barkai (2016) directly assumes constant returns to scale 
?=1 for the US corporate sector so market power is uniquely determined by profit shares. We 
estimate the market power on the same assumption of constant returns to scale as Barkai to 
facilitate the comparisons, although in the robustness section we test the hypothesis of 
constant returns to scale with sector level data from the four Euro area countries and the 
hypothesis is not rejected in any of them.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
18??This estimation could be biased as it does not consider capital-augmenting technological progress in the production 
function. However we find no correlation between the estimated residual of the fitted regression, a proxy for capital-
augmenting technological progress, and the ratio of relative input prices.  Alternatively, we checked that the estimation 
of the results did not change significantly when introducing a time trend capturing a Hicks-neutral technological 
progress.?
19??Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013) estimate values for the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital greater 
than one (1.25) although the estimation methodology is different from that used here.  
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Substituting the observed profit shares in equation (8) with ?=1 we obtain the implicit 
corporate market power 1/? for each country and year. The results appear in Figure 11. The 
inferred mark-ups on prices of corporate sectors of Germany and the US increased steadily from 
2000 onwards, which points to evidence for increasing market power of corporations in the two 
countries over time. The estimate of market power for German corporations was consistently 
above that for US corporations; the absolute difference between the estimated mark-ups for the 
two countries remains quite stable over time, except in the final years of the sample period when 
it goes up. In 2000, the mark-up is close to 1 in the two countries (no market power) and in 2016 
is 1.25 for German corporations and 1.1 for the US corporations. In other words, the German 
corporations sell their products on average at a price 25% above their unit cost, while US 
corporations sell their products at a price on average 10% above their unit cost.  
Figure 11. Market Power Estimates, Mark-ups, 1/??, with Constant Returns to Scale, ?=1 
The market power of corporate sectors in Italy and Spain remained at minimum values 
from the launch of the euro until 2012, and then increased in the later years of the sample 
period, getting close to the US’s mark-up value.20 The mark-up of French corporations has 
been close to one in all years since 2008.  
The market power estimated for US corporations in this paper is lower than that 
estimated by Barkai (2016), although it follows a similar pattern over time. We attribute this 
difference in levels to the fact that our measure of capital stock calculated for the corporate 
sector of the US is higher than the capital stock in Barkai (2016).21 With a lower capital stock 
the estimated market power of US corporations would resemble our estimates of market 
power for German corporations more closely.  
 
7.3 Cost competitive advantage  
We will now discuss the scenario of open economies and national corporate sectors 
competing in a single global market. National corporate sectors’ profit shares are no longer 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
20??Using individual firm data Montero and Urtasun (2014) find a similar cyclical behaviour for the Spanish corporations’ 
mark-ups, although in their estimation the mark-ups increase from 2007 until 2011. In the early years of the sample 
(1995-2000) the price of capital services in Italy shows very erratic dynamics affecting the values of the mark-ups.?
21??Our estimated measure of capital stock, relative to GVA minus net production taxes, is approximately 20% higher than 
the series employed by Barkai (2016) for the US over the period 1995-2014. Using Barkai’s capital stock measure, the 
difference between our mark-up estimates and those of Barkai are reduced from 11% to 5% in the average period 
1995-2014.?
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determined by the market structure variables at the national level but by differences in 
production unit costs, according to (9). We therefore focus on the unit production cost of the 
respective corporate sector over time calculated as, 
?????????????????????? ?
?????????????????
???
?? ? ?               (11) 
Where the measure of total output Y is equal to the GVA of the corresponding country 
deflated by the GDP deflator. 
The estimated unit production costs are shown in Figure 12. The German corporate sector 
has the lowest unit production cost throughout practically the whole sample period. Moreover, since 
the unit cost of the German corporate sector stayed stable over the sample period while the unit 
cost of the corporate sectors in the other countries increased, the competitive cost advantage of 
German corporations relative to those in the other countries in the sample also increased over time. 
For example, the unit production cost of corporations in the US was similar to that of German 
corporations at the beginning of the period but was 30% higher in 2016. Figure 12 shows the unit 
cost of US corporations adjusted for the exchange rate of the dollar against the euro (US production 
costs in euros). The appreciation of the dollar in 2000-2001 and in 2015-2016 increased the 
competitive advantage of German corporations over their US counterparts more than the cost 
advantage assuming the exchange rate had remained unchanged from the 1995 level.   
For the remainder of the euro area countries, unit costs decreased in the pre-euro 
years while from 2000 onwards they all showed an upward trend lasting until 2012. Over this 
period, unit costs increased by around 30% in France, 40% in Spain and 50% in Italy. Between 
2012 and 2016, the unit cost of the corporate sectors of France and Italy remained relatively 
stable, while Spanish corporations reduced their cost disadvantage with respect to their 
German peers from 66% in 2012 to less than 50% in 2016. 
Figure 12. Average Unit Production Costs, ???? ?
?????????????????
???
  
 
The unit production cost ac is equal to the sum of the unit labour cost,
??
?
, and the unit 
capital cost, ????
?
. Figure 13 shows the evolution of each component of the unit production 
cost for the five countries. The unit labour cost has been steadily increasing over time in the 
corporate sectors of France, Italy and the US. In the Spanish corporate sector, unit labour 
costs increased between 1995 and 2008 and decreased moderately in the years of the crisis, 
stabilising during the recovery. This was the opposite of the trend in German corporations’ unit 
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labour costs, which decreased moderately in the pre-crisis years of expansion and increased 
moderately from 2008 to 2016. 
 Figure 13. Unit Labour and Capital Costs and Total Unit Costs  
 
 
 
 
In Spain, the years of decreasing unit labour costs coincided with a period of 
increasing unit capital costs such that total unit costs continued to rise until 2012. In the 
German corporate sector the moderate increase in unit labour costs between 2008 and 2016 
coincided with a period of decreasing unit capital costs, such that the total unit cost remained 
unchanged. The unit capital cost of the corporate sectors in Spain and Italy increased over the 
period 2007-2012, reaching values similar to those at the start of the period. The capital unit 
cost of corporations in US and in France remained stable throughout the period.  
The summary of the inferences from the aggregate empirical evidence is then as 
follows: For the US, the inferred elasticity of substitution between labour and capital equal to 
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one suggests that the fall in the labour and capital cost shares over time and the increase in the 
profit share can be reasonably attributed to increasing market power. For EU countries with 
inferred elasticity of substitution less than one, the differences in cost shares across countries 
and their changes over time can be explained by both differences between countries and 
changes in relative input prices and, possibly, by differences in market power in the scenario of 
closed economies, and by differences in production unit costs, in the scenario of a single open 
global market. To examine these explanations more closely, the following section complements 
the evidence from aggregate data with evidence from sector level data in the subsample of 
Euro countries.  
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8? Robustness: industry level evidence 
The data source of the industry level data is CompNet, a database of inputs and outputs 
covering around 60 2-digit NACE sectors, available for France, Germany, Italy and Spain, 
although not for the US. For this reason the robustness analysis is limited to euro area 
corporate sectors. The industry level robustness analysis has two main aims, to test the 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale in production used in the calculation of market power 
from profit shares (Figure 11) and to assess the potential link between profit shares and 
market power through differences and trends in market concentration (Barkai’s findings for 
the US case).22 
The details of the econometric test of the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale 
with the industry level data and under different estimation methods are presented in Appendix C. 
We find that estimates of the parameter of the returns to scale are consistently around values 
close to one in several estimation methodologies that take into account the unobserved variable 
of technological progress. Therefore, the constant returns to scale assumption appears a 
plausible one for the corporate sectors of the four countries. Then, according to the theory, 
differences in profit share can be attributed to differences in market power. 
Next, we calculated the profit share for each of the 2-digit sectors in the CompNet 
database, 
???
??????
. The calculation assumes the same financial cost of capital for all the 2-digit 
sectors of the respective country. The measure of market power for each 2-digit industry is 
calculated from equation (8), with ?=1. Finally, the aggregate corporate sector market power 
measure is equal to the sum of industry market powers weighted by the GVA of each sector 
and country.  
Figure 14 shows the estimated mark-ups with profit shares calculated using aggregate 
corporate data (Figure 11) and the estimated corporate market power with profit shares 
calculated at the 2-digit industry level and subsequently aggregated. Although the absolute 
values of estimated market power differs depending on the calculation, their trends over time 
are fairly similar in all countries. Therefore, the estimates of corporate market power in Figure 
11 appear robust to the estimation of market power using industry level data on profit shares.   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
22??The estimated elasticity of substitution between labour and capital using sectoral data confirms a value less than one in 
the euro area countries.????
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Figure 14. Aggregate Nonfinancial Corporate Sector Mark-ups vs. Industry-Weighted 
Mark-ups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source and notes: mark-up estimates based on National Accounts data (aggregate non-financial corporate sector data) 
are shown as blue lines (excluding net subsidies on production and tax treatment effects). Mark-up estimates based on 
sector-level data from CompNet (weighted across around sixty 2-digit NACE sectors), are shown by red lines. In France, 
the pharmaceuticals sector has been excluded from the sector-weighted mark-up calculation due to its high volatility. In 
Germany, the sector-weighted mark-up takes into account a correction for the capital stock underestimation problem 
presented in balance-sheet data of the country’s corporate sector (see Salas et al. (2017)). For Spain, there are no data for 
the period up to 2007 in CompNet on the nominal capital stock and the proxy for the user cost of capital, so we have 
made two approximations to estimate the capital shares and, therefore, the mark-ups, across sectors, namely: i) we take 
our aggregate capital share estimates (principally, from NA data) as given (lower band), and ii) we reproduce the ratio 
between the nominal capital stock and the nominal GVA with CompNet data with some assumptions about their deflators 
and apply our aggregate measure of the user cost of capital shown in Appendix B. Capital share estimates are available in 
CompNet for the period 2008-2013. These are not shown here, but are within the range shown in the figure. 
 
Barkai (2016) finds a positive association between industry level estimates of market 
power and industry level concentration in the US corporate sector. We now examine if the 
positive association between market power and market concentration also holds for the 
corporate sectors of the euro area countries. For each 1-digit industry we obtain the mark-up 
by aggregating the mark-ups calculated for each of the 2-digit sectors that share the same 1-
digit number. The concentration ratio is calculated by aggregating the share of the sales of the 
10 largest companies over the total sales of firms in the 2-digit sectors with the same 1-digit 
number. Figure 15A shows the estimated sector mark-ups for the four corporate sectors, and 
Figure 15B shows the concentration ratios for the same sectors and countries over the period 
2000-2013, for which information is available.   
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Figure 15A. Aggregate mark-ups: breakdown by sector 
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Figure 15B. Sector concentration 
 
 
In Germany, the increase over time in mark-ups (until 2012) seems to be occurring in 
manufacturing and some service sectors (wholesale and retail trade, transportation and 
storage, and professional & technical). This trend is not observed in the other countries in the 
sample, except in the case of a few service activities. In fact, in the manufacturing sectors of 
France, Italy and Spain the trend observed in mark-ups is the opposite of that observed in the 
German manufacturing sector. 
The visual inspection of Figures 14 and 15B suggests that, in aggregate terms, mark-
ups are apparently uncorrelated or only slightly correlated with industry concentration. 
However, heterogeneity across sectors could mask a significant relationship between both 
magnitudes. To account for differences across sectors in this relationship, we consider the 
following fixed effect regression: 
???? ?
????
? ? ?? ? ??????? ? ?? ? ???? ? ? ? ? ???????????????(12) 
where ???? ?
????
? is the mark-up in logs of the sector s at time t, that is, the inverse of 
the complement of the profit share for each sector at period t, ???? is the concentration ratio –
in percentage points- of the sector s at time t, calculated as the total sales of the ten largest 
firms in each sector divided by the total sales in that sector at period t, ?? is the term 
associated with the fixed idiosyncratic characteristics of each sector and ???? is the error term. 
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We also added time dummies (??) to capture any contemporaneous correlation across sectors 
or common business cycle effects. We assume that ???? is a predetermined exogenous 
variable, i.e. it is not correlated with present and future error terms (?????????????? ? ???? ?
?? ?? ).a 
As an alternative to determine the significance in the relationship between industry 
concentration and mark-ups, we also perform a second regression based on equation (12), but 
in first differences: 
????? ?
????
? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ???? ? ? ? ? ???????????????(13) 
As the error term in (9) is defined as ???? ? ???? ? ??????, our predetermined 
regressor assumption in (8) does not warrant the absence of endogeneity of ????? as ???? can 
be correlated with ???? via ??????. To mitigate the correlation between the regressor in first 
differences and the new error term resulting from first-differencing, we estimated (13) using the 
two-step feasible Generalised Method of Moments (GMM). For the instrumental variable, 
?????, we use the concentration ratio lagged one period as the instrument23 (??????) given our 
assumption that ?????????????? ? ???? ? ?? ??: 
?????????????????? ? ????????????? ? ???????????? ? ???????? ? ??
In the estimation of both equations, (12) and (13), we allowed for heteroskedasticity 
and serial autocorrelation in the error terms. In particular, we clustered them by 2-digit NACE 
sector. Finally, a test of the endogeneity of the regressor in equation (13) was performed. Under 
the null hypothesis of this test the specified endogenous regressor (concentration ratio in first 
differences, ?????) can be treated as exogenous. 
? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
23??We have also considered as instruments other lags in the level of the concentration ratio but the results are very similar 
to those obtained with the first lag.?
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?
Table 2. The Relationship between Mark-ups and Industry Concentration: 2-digit NACE.   
 
Sources and notes: CompNet. The results of several regressions are reported either of sectoral mark-ups in logs of 
sectoral concentration ratios in percentage points (Ordinary Least Squares, Feasible Generalised Least Squares-random 
effects-, and fixed effects), or the previous variables in differences (first differences -annual -, differences in the whole 
common sample period 2001-2012, differences in periods 2001-2007 and 2007-2012, and five-year differences during 
2001-2012). The observations of cross-section and of cumulative differences of several years’ regressions are weighted by 
sectors' shares in GVA (in each year and in the last year of each difference, respectively). First difference regressions are 
performed with 2-step feasible Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) where the instrumental variable is the 
concentration ratio in first differences and the instrument is the concentration ratio lagged one period in order to mitigate 
the correlation between the regressor in first differences and the new error term arose when first-differencing the equation 
in levels. *** Indicates significant at 1%; ** at 5%, and * at 10%. P-values for regression coefficients are reported in 
parenthesis. Standard errors, not reported, are clustered by 2-digit NACE sector (around 60 sectors), and are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial autocorrelation. A test for endogenous regressors was implemented in the case of the first 
difference estimation, and the p-values are reported. Under the null hypothesis for this test the specified endogenous 
regressor (concentration ratio in first differences) can actually be treated as exogenous. Data from Germany, Italy and 
Spain come from the full sample of firms, meaning all firm sizes. For France, only data on companies with more than 20 
employees are available. The sample periods are the following: 2000-2012 for France, 2000-2012 for Germany, 2001-
2013 for Italy, and 1995-2013 for Spain. In the case of France, we excluded the pharmaceutical manufacturing sector due 
to the strong volatility of some of the variables underlying the calculation of its mark-up. In the case of Germany, we 
adjusted the mark-ups by the same proportion across sectors to take into account the capital stock underestimation 
problem presented in balance-sheet data of the corporate sector of this country (see Salas et al. (2017)). In Spain, data up 
to 2007 in CompNet on the nominal capital stock and the proxy for the user cost of capital across sectors are missing, so 
we have taken our capital share estimates for the corporate sector as a whole (principally, from National Accounts data) as 
a proxy to estimate the capital shares and, therefore, the mark-ups across sectors. The sectoral mark-up is defined as the 
inverse of the complement of the profit share for each sector. The sectoral concentration ratio is defined as the total sales 
of the ten largest firms in each sector divided by the total sales in that sector. 
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Table 2 shows the panel data results of the fixed effects estimation of (12), the GMM 
estimation of (13) as well as OLS and GLS estimations for comparison purposes (columns 1-5). 
P-values for the regressions’ coefficients are reported in parenthesis.  For all countries 
analysed, France, Germany, Italy and Spain there is no significant relationship between mark-
ups and industry concentration once we control for heterogeneity across sectors. Given the 
slow changes in concentration over time, the second part of Table 2 (columns 6-10) shows 
different cross section regressions for alternative sample periods, as well as a five-year rolling 
regression (column 11). We find similar results as under the panel data regressions: those 
sectors with higher concentration ratios do not necessarily have higher mark-ups, even when 
taking into account variations in the economic cycle.24 Interestingly, in these last two 
regressions (columns 10 and 11) the estimated intercept coefficient is statistically non-zero in 
the case of German industry, indicating an average increase in the market power across 
sectors during the sample period after controlling for changes in concentration.25  
Thus, the increasing mark-ups in Germany cannot be attributed to increasing market 
concentration and, rather, the alternative explanation that increasing profits of German 
corporations respond to German corporations’ increasing competitive advantage in terms of 
costs over time, appears as a plausible one. These results are in clear contrast with those 
obtained for the United States, as reported in the most recent literature paying renewed 
attention to the relationship between mark-ups and firm concentration (Barkai, 2016; Grullon et 
al., 2017; Eggertsson et al, 2018), where it is shown that this relation has been positive for US 
corporations over the last two decades. 
?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
24??The same econometric evidence holds when the sectoral concentration ratio is substituted by the Herfindahl index. We 
also considered a regression with the labour share instead of the market power as the dependent variable with 
identical results.?
25??This intercept is also significant and positive in the Spanish case but this may be influenced by the fact that before 
2007 sectoral data on the user cost of capital and the price of capital had to be proxied by total NFC aggregate data.??
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9? Conclusions  
Conventional macroeconomic accounting divides the value added generated by economic 
activity over a period of time into labour and non-labour income. However, this practice masks 
information on business profits that is relevant for the assessment of market competition, 
investment incentives, and income inequality. In this paper we first provide evidence on the 
composition of aggregate gross value added, including the labour and capital cost shares and 
the profit share, of the corporate sectors in France, Germany, Italy and Spain, and compare it 
with the composition of corporate gross value added in the US. We then examine the evidence 
as if profit maximising firms decided the quantities of capital and labour used in production by 
the corporate sectors of the different countries. On this assumption, the composition of gross 
value added is determined by exogenous parameters of the production technology, market 
structure variables and the relative unit prices of labour and capital.  
We find no clear evidence of convergence in costs and profit shares among euro 
area corporate sectors, although the trends towards convergence vary in the pre-crisis and 
crisis years. The atypical trend in the German corporate sector played a big part in this lack 
of convergence, as its financial costs declined from 2009 onwards, while in the other 
corporate sectors, particularly Spain’s and Italy’s, financial costs rose during the crisis. 
Compared with the evidence from other studies, the aggregate labour cost shares of the four 
euro area corporate sectors reported in this paper are not consistent with the hypothesis of 
a widespread decreasing time trend in the aggregate labour cost shares in the value added 
of developed countries. However, the profit share of the German corporate sector developed 
remarkably over time above and in parallel with the profit share of the US corporate sector, 
both increasing over time.  
When looking at the evidence from the standpoint of theoretical predictions, the 
results suggest that the explanation for trends in labour cost shares in euro area corporate 
sectors has to take into account changes in relative input prices. This is not the case for the 
US corporate sector where the trend in labour cost shares is more likely to be driven by 
developments in market power. The justifications of these results have to do with the 
evidence found in the paper on an elasticity of substitution between labour and capital lower 
than that in the corporate sectors of the euro area countries, and equal to one in the US 
corporate sector. In the explanation of the time course of profit shares, the evidence from 
corporate profits in the US may be consistent with increasing corporate market power. 
However, in the case of Germany, the upward trend in corporate profit shares is consistent 
with the comparative production cost advantage of their corporations relative to the costs of 
corporations from other countries.  
From a policy point of view, this paper highlights the relevance of distinguishing 
between costs and economic profits in the composition of corporate value added, in the 
assessment of production efficiency and when expressing income distribution concerns. The 
euro was launched with the aim of creating a single financial market to complement the single 
market for goods and services, including labour services. The evidence reported here shows 
ups and downs in the convergence of user cost of capital among euro area corporate sectors 
during the period of study. But what is clear from the evidence is that the competitive cost 
advantage of German corporations with respect to corporations in other euro area countries 
increased during the sample period, mainly because their financial cost, in terms of both debt 
and equity, remains substantially lower than the financial cost paid by corporations in other 
euro area countries. The cost advantage of German corporations appears again in the 
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comparison with US corporations, but in this case the final competitive advantage can vary 
with exchange rate movements of the euro/dollar. It seems clear then that the creation of the 
euro area was not sufficient for effective financial integration, and further steps are needed.  
The implications of the reported evidence for the distribution of income are of two 
kinds. First, increasing profit shares will contribute to income inequality if all economic profits 
are distributed to shareholders in the form of dividends or capital gains (ownership of capital is 
even more concentrated than is income). Second, with values of the elasticity of substitution of 
labour by capital different from one, the share of value added as compensation for labour 
inputs will be sensitive to changes in relative input prices. In particular, if salaries increase more 
than the user cost of capital the labour cost share will increase (decrease) if the elasticity of 
substitution is lower (greater) than one. Our results indicate values of the elasticity of 
substitution less than or equal to one, but they must be taken as very preliminary given the 
characteristics of the data available.  
The empirical analysis of cost and profit shares has been done under the assumption 
of competitive input markets, labour and capital. We have not considered the effect of changes 
in labour market regulations, among other factors, in reducing employees’ negotiating power, 
as an additional explanation of decreasing labour shares and increasing profits.  In the 
theoretical appendix there is a discussion of how to extend the analysis to account for non-
competitive labour markets where employers and employees negotiate just wages or wages 
and employment at the same time. Other lines of research (Naidu et al., 2018) argue that 
increasing concentration in many economic sectors increases the market power of employers 
in already “monopsonised” labour markets. Future research should extend the analysis 
reported here to examine the influence of changing labour markets in the evolution of cost and 
profit shares.   
?
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Appendix A. Theoretical framework 
This appendix presents the determinants of cost and profits shares when the quantities of 
inputs and outputs used in the calculations come from decisions made by profit-maximising 
firms. Although the analysis will consider a representative profit-maximising firm, the analytical 
results can be extrapolated to the whole corporate sector if the sector values of cost and profit 
shares are obtained by aggregating individual corporations’ inputs and their output decisions.  
Consider the production function ? ? ???? ?? where output ? is increasing and 
concave on labor, L, and capital, K, inputs. If the function is homogeneous of degree ? ? ? 
the following holds,  
??
??
? ?
??
??
? ? ??? 
Dividing both sides of the equation by Y 
??
??
?
?
?
??
??
?
?
? ? 
and  
???? ? ???? ? ? 
where ???? ?
??
??
? ?
?
 is the elasticity of output to changes in input j, J=L, J=K.  
The economy’s representative firm sells its output on the market with a price elasticity 
of demand that is constant and equal to ? ? ? (in absolute values). The competitive market 
prices are w, wages per employee, and R, user cost of capital per euro of the stock of capital 
services at current purchase prices. In the profit-maximising solution for labour and capital 
resource inputs, the cost share of labour and capital and the economic profit share are equal to 
(with all variables evaluated at their optimal values): 
                                                        ??
??
? ??????????????????????????                (A1) 
                                                                
????
??
? ?????                              (A2)?
                                          
??????????
??
? ?
??
? ? ? ??                         (A3)?
where p is the profit maximising output price and ? ? ???
?
. The inverse of ? is also 
the mark-up over marginal cost that determines the profit-maximizing output price. Therefore 
?
?
? ???
?
 is a measure of market power of the firm, inversely related to the price elasticity of 
demand (when the price elasticity of demand tends to infinity (the firm is a price taker) the 
mark-up is one, meaning that price is equal to marginal cost.  
Under constant returns to scale, ? ? ???and no market power (? ? ?? ? ? ?), the 
share of the labour cost (capital cost) in the value of production is equal to the labour (capital) 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 48 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1833
elasticity of output in the production function and the economic profit share will be equal to 
zero. In other words, under constant returns to scale and no market power (the firm is a price 
taker) the share of the capital input cost in value added is just one minus the share of the 
labour cost. Moreover, if the elasticity of output to the labour inputs is a constant, as in the 
Cobb Douglas production function, the share of labour costs and the share of capital costs in 
the total revenues of the firm will also be constant.  
From (A1) and (A2) the shares of labour and capital input costs in the value of 
production will increase with ? and will be equal to the respective elasticity of output to the 
quantity of input if ?=1 (perfect competition). On the other hand, greater market power in the 
product market, i.e. lower ?, and lower ?, will decrease the shares of labour input costs in the 
value of production and consequently will increase the profit share. 
If we examine the determinants of the profit share (A3) directly we have: 
?
??
? ? ? ?? ?
? ? ??? ? ??
?
 
The optimal profit margin decreases with the returns to scale ? and decreases also 
with the price elasticity of demand, ?. The profit margin in (A3) depends on the parameter of 
returns to scale ? because the profit margin in (A3) is calculated using average cost while in the 
profit maximising condition marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. Under constant returns 
to scale, ? ? ?, the marginal production cost (of labour and capital) will be equal to average 
unit production cost and the profit share will be equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of 
demand in absolute value (Lerner index of market power): 
?
??
?
?
?
?
Under decreasing (increasing) returns to scale, ? < (>) 1, the marginal unit cost is 
higher (lower) than the average unit cost and the firm will earn a positive (negative) profit margin 
even if the market is competitive. If returns to scale are increasing, the market will evolve into a 
structure of natural monopoly. Under decreasing returns to scale positive economic profits will 
attract new entrants into the market until price equals average cost.  
In purely accounting terms, the share of labour costs in the value added may coincide 
with an increase in the capital cost share, an increase in the profit share and an increase in 
both capital and profit shares. When both labour and capital shares decrease then the profit 
share will necessarily increase. What the profit maximising results above suggest is that costs 
and profit shares can change as a result of changes in the values of the parameters of the 
production and demand functions and/or changes in the relative input prices. For example, 
from (A1) differences across countries in the labour cost shares will indicate differences in the 
production technology (elasticity of output to labour) and/or differences in the demand function 
(price elasticity).  
Oligopolistic market 
So far we have assumed that the representative firm in the economy is a monopoly with price-
inelastic demand for the final product. We now complete the exposition with the Nash 
equilibrium results in a market with N>2 firms competing in quantities and homogeneous 
product. In the Nash-Cournot equilibrium the following results holds for firm j in the market: 
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? ????
?
?
??
?
 
Where p is the market price (the same for all firms since the product is homogeneous) 
ci is the marginal unit production cost of firm j, sj is the market share of firm j and ? is the price 
elasticity of demand as an absolute value, as above. Multiplying both sides by the market share 
sj and adding the terms we have: 
? ? ????
?
?
?
?
 
Where ????  is the weighted average marginal unit production cost of firms in the 
market, ???? ? ??? ???, and H is the Herfindahl index of market concentration calculated as, 
? ? ????. Therefore, the market price as a function of the industry weighted marginal cost is 
given by, 
? ?
?
? ? ?
????  
The mark-up over marginal cost is then equal to 
?
???
, increasing with market 
concentration H and decreasing with the price elasticity of demand,??.26 If we view a country’s 
corporate sector as a market with N firms and a concentration H, then equations (A1) to (A3) 
above would have to be changed by substituting ??? ? ?
???
 with only one firm, by ???? ?
?
???
 with N firms and Cournot competition 
In most cases the marginal cost will not be observable and it will have to be 
substituted for by the industry average cost ??? 
 ?? ? ?????
?
 
Since the average and marginal unit costs are related by the scale economies 
parameter,??? ? ???, the mark-up over average cost is equal to ?
??
? ?
??????
.  
If firms have the same unit costs then, at equilibrium, H=1/N (all firms will have the same 
market share). However if firms have different unit costs more efficient firms will have a larger 
market share and a higher profit margin in the equilibrium. The profit share in this case will be, 
  
??
???
?
?????
?
 
Differences in profit share among firms and the evolution of profit share of the firm over 
time will be explained by differences and changes in the respective unit production cost.  
For the application of these results to the analysis of the cost and profit shares of the 
corporate sectors of the different countries, the analysis above can be extended to consider 
each corporate sector as a representative firm that competes with the representative firms of 
the other countries in the same (global) market. In this case concentration and price elasticity of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26??Higher concentration also facilitates tacit collusion around the monopoly solution (Tirole, 1988).?
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demand will be defined at the global market level and each national corporate sector could be 
viewed as a competitor in that market.  
Employees with bargaining power 
So far we have assumed that labour and capital input markets are competitive, so input unit 
prices reflect true opportunity costs. When this happens, the residual profit ? can be 
considered to be equal to the firm’s economic profit. This assumption may not always hold, 
particularly in the case of labour markets where trade unions negotiate wages and/or 
employment levels with employers. Negotiations between employers and employees can take 
two forms: one where the employees negotiate the salary, w, and the number of employees L 
is decided by the firm, and another where employees negotiate the total labour income, wL.  
If the outcome of the negotiations is the Nash bargaining equilibrium in both cases, in 
the first case, where unions negotiate the highest wages w, the agreed wages are the marginal 
cost of labour, and will generally exceed the opportunity cost. The profit-maximising firm will set 
its prices equal to marginal cost where this factors in the agreed price of labour. In the bargain 
equilibrium, profit and labour compensation are given by: 
?? ? ?? ? ? ??? ? ??????
?? ? ? ??? ? ? ? ?? ? ???? ?
Where the ? symbol means that the price of labour has been negotiated with the 
unions and the bargained price affects the demand of labour and the demand for capital in the 
profit maximising solution. In terms of profit and labour cost shares, 
??
?? ?
? ?? ? ????
???
?? ?
? ??????
On the other hand, if the unions’ goal in the bargaining process is to maximise total 
compensation for labour, wL, the residual profit and labour compensation in the Nash bargain 
equilibrium solution will be given by: 
?? ? ??? ? ?? ? ????? ? ?? ? ??????
?????????????????? ? ?? ? ???
? ?
Where ? is a parameter between 0 and 1 that measures the bargaining power of 
employees, and the rest of variables are defined as above, i.e. w is the market wage or unit 
opportunity cost of labour. Again, in terms of profit and labour cost shares, 
?? ? ???
??
? ?? ? ????? ? ?? 
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                     ??????????????????????????????
??
? ????? ? ??? ? ????  
The total output produced, the demand for labour and total wealth created in the 
optimal solution when employees negotiate wages and employment at the same time are 
higher than the values of output, employment and wealth when they only negotiate higher 
wages and firms decide the number of employees given the bargained salary. Therefore, from 
a social efficiency point of view the bargaining over total labour compensation is preferred to 
negotiating wages alone.  
When the unions negotiate total labour compensation, i.e. wages times the number of 
employees, then the marginal optimal conditions are not distorted in the sense that the number 
of employees hired by the firm is the same as would be hired in the absence of negotiations; 
the reason is that in both cases the perceived marginal cost of labour is the market price w 
(opportunity cost). What the bargaining between employers and employees does is simply 
allocate the economic profits between the employees and the business owners (residual 
claimants). When employees bargain for the salary only then the bargained salary is the 
marginal cost of labour for firms when deciding the profit maximising number of employees that 
they want to hire. Since this will be higher than the market price w then firms reduce the 
demand of labour compared with the demand at the market opportunity cost.  
In practice, National Accounts data reports total compensation of labour without 
distinguishing how this compensation is generated, i.e. with the employees sharing the 
economic profit in addition to earning the market wage, or just earning wages above the 
opportunity cost. Nothing has been said so far about the destination of the residual profit. The 
role of the entrepreneur/manager is different from that of employees and the compatibility of 
incentives recommends that for efficient decisions they should receive the residual profit as 
compensation for their work. Again, in practice, it is not possible to know if all or part of the 
compensation of entrepreneurs/managers for their services is included in the reported labour 
compensation or not. Moreover, if the entrepreneur managing the business were also the 
financier paying for the firm’s productive capital, then the user cost of capital would be capital 
income for the entrepreneur. When the financiers are external investors then their 
compensation will come from the financial cost of capital (user cost minus depreciation). In the 
case of workers’ cooperatives, the economic profits would all be income for the cooperative’s 
partners (who are also its workers).   
Long-term profits 
Firms’ market power can also be reflected in the ratio of their market value to the replacement 
cost of their assets, or Tobin’s q. This measure of market power takes into account the 
expectation about the future course of profit margins. With the notation and results from above, 
if V is the market value of the capital stock, equal to the present value of cash flow discounted 
at the cost of capital R, the ratio q for a profit-maximising firm with constant returns to scale 
can be written as follows: 
? ?
?
???
?
???? ? ?
?
???
? ? ?
?
?
?
???
? ? ?
?
?
?
??
??
???
? ? ?
?
?
?
?
?
?????
? ? ?
?
?????? ? ??
?
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The ratio converges to the value of 1 if the firm has no market power, infinity price 
elasticity. For a given positive market power, Tobin’s q decreases with higher elasticity of 
output to the capital input.  
Example: CES production. 
Consider the CES production function: 
? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ??????
??
? ?
Where A represents the level of technological development, ? ? ? ? ??is a parameter 
indicating the relative intensity of labour in the production technology, and ? is related to the 
elasticity of substitution ?, ? ? ?
???
? ? ? ??. When ? ? ? the CES transforms into a 
Cobb-Douglas production function with elasticity of substitution ? ? ?, and elasticity of 
output to labour????? ? ??. In general, the elasticity of output to labour in the CES 
production function is given by, 
                                              ???? ?
?
?????? ?
?
??
? 
If the ratio of labour to capital is evaluated at the profit maximising values, 
                                       ?
?
? ? ????
??????
?
?
???
 
And the labour share is equal to: 
                              
??
??
? ?????? ? ?
??
??????? ?
?
???????? ?
?
???
 
Changes in relative prices of inputs, wages and user cost of capital can result in shifts 
in the cost shares between labour and capital inputs, although the direction will depend on the 
value of the elasticity of substitution. For example, higher wages w relative to the user cost 
????will increase the elasticity of output to the labor input, and therefore the labor cost share, 
if?? ? ?, that is if the elasticity of substitution is less than one. But it will decrease the labour 
share if ? ? ?, i.e. the elasticity of substitution is greater than one. With these formulas we can 
complete the rest of expression for profit and capital shares. 
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Appendix B. Elements of the calculation of the per unit user cost of capital 
From equation (2) in the main text, the calculation of the unit user cost of capital requires the 
estimation of: the financial costs of debt and equity; the proportion of debt and equity in the 
total assets financed; the price inflation rate; the depreciation rate; and corporate tax 
variables27. 
Financial cost of capital 
The financial opportunity cost of capital is equal to the weighted average of the opportunity 
cost of debt and the opportunity cost of equity, where the weights are the respective 
proportions of debt and equity in the corporate sector balance sheet.28 
Given the importance of financing from the banking sector has for European 
companies, the cost of debt ???  for the NFCs of each of the euro area countries is set equal to 
the interest rate on new long-term lending operations in year t, as reported country by country 
in the ECB dataset. On the other hand, US corporations rely more on marketable debt 
securities issued and for this reason, the interest rate on debt is set equal to the yield on 
Moody’s Aaa bond portfolio for each year. Figure B1 shows the evolution of the estimated cost 
of debt for the NFCs of each country in the sample period29. 
Figure B1. Cost of Corporate Debt, ??? (%) 
?
Since 1999, the corporate cost of debt has been higher for the US than for the euro 
area corporations, with the exception of 2008, the year of the financial crisis when the two 
coincide. On average, US corporations pay 2 pp more for their debt than their German 
counterparts. There is a similar difference between the US and the euro area when analysing 
the average cost of debt calculated from the NFC sectors’ income statement and the balance 
sheet data (Salas et al. 2017) 
In all the countries, the nominal cost of debt was on a downward trend throughout the 
sample period, interrupted by the tightening of monetary policy by the ECB in the pre-crisis 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
27??Data of these variables are available in Data Appendix.???
28??We consider the time-varying liability composition of the NFCs. Thus, in expression (2), bt-1 and (1-bt-1) are the 
weights for debt and equity finance, respectively.?
29??The data on the interest rates applied to corporate loans for European countries are monthly and on the US corporate 
bonds yields are daily. We take annual averages of these data for each country.?
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years, 2006-2008. In the case of Spain, for example, the cost fell from almost 10% in 1995 to 
2.2% in 2016. With the euro, the cost of debt for corporations in the euro area countries 
converged towards the low values of France and Germany, but diverged again, particularly for 
Spanish and Italian corporations in the wake of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011-
2012, which had some lagged effects on bank financing costs, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
Formally, the opportunity cost of equity (?) is the discount factor for which the 
present value of current and future dividends that shareholders expect to receive from holding 
shares of the company equals to the current market value of the shares. Expressed in price 
and dividends per share, the discount factor we are interested in is the value of ? that solves 
the equation, 
?????? ?
??????
? ? ?????
 
or, 
? ? ?
??????
??????
? ????? 
where ?????? is the current dividend per share, ?????? is the current share price, and 
????? is the expected constant future growth rate of dividends per share. The financial cost of 
equity is then equal to the current dividend returns per share (known as the “dividend yield”) 
plus the expected future growth rate in dividends. Firms with stable production capacity will 
distribute all their profits as dividends (the investment to replace depreciated capacity will be 
financed with depreciation allowances). In this case, ?????=0 and dividend per share is simply 
equal to profit per share.  
For stock market-listed firms, the current and past values of the share price and the 
dividends per share (the inverse of the Price-Earnings Ratio or PER) are public information but 
the expected growth rate of future dividends is not an observable value. The calculation of the 
cost of equity thus requires a subjective assessment of the expected growth rate of dividends. 
At the firm level, the future growth of dividends is often estimated by extrapolation of past 
values. At the macro level, the evolution of corporate dividends is assumed to be parallel to that 
of macroeconomic variables. Hence, estimates of the future growth rates of dividends used in 
practice include the forecasts of the nominal GDP growth rates or expectations about risk-free 
interest rates.30 
In this paper, the cost of equity is calculated as the sum of the dividend price ratio, 
based on dividend and price per share data from the companies listed on the main stock 
exchanges of the various countries, and the 10-year sovereign bond yield of the corresponding 
country. Therefore, the interest rate on the 10-year sovereign bond is our estimate of the long-
term expected nominal growth rate of the economy. As a robustness check, we have also 
estimated the opportunity cost of equity using the long-term expected annual growth of the 
nominal GDP of the economy as an estimate of the expected annual growth rate of dividends 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
30??See Fama and French (1988) and Barkai (2016).??
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per share of its NFCs; the results are very similar to those obtained using the 10-year sovereign 
bond yield.31 The estimated costs of equity are shown in Figure B2. 
Figure B2. Cost of Corporate Equity, ? (%) 
 
US corporations pay a cost for their equity similar to that paid by German firms. 
Moreover, the cost of equity for US corporations is similar to their cost of debt (average 
differential rate of 0.7 pp in the sample period), while for the corporations in the euro area 
equity is more expensive than debt, with an average differential rate of 4.1 pp in France, 2.2 pp 
in Germany, 3.5 pp in Italy and 4.2 pp in Spain. The fragmentation of financial markets with the 
sovereign debt crisis also affected the equity markets. In 2011 and 2012, the cost of equity 
peaked at close to 13% in Spain and to 10% in Italy, compared with less than 6% in Germany. 
At the end of the sample period the cost of equity among corporate sectors of the different 
euro area countries was significantly higher than the cost of debt and tended to converge again 
among the corporate sectors of the different countries, although for the German corporations 
the cost of equity was still around 2.5 pp lower than the cost of equity for Spanish, Italian and 
French corporations.  
The third element in the calculation of the financial cost of capital is the weighting 
applied to each source of finance. As stated earlier these weights will be the respective 
proportions of debt (??) and equity (1-??) in the liabilities of the corresponding country 
corporations, as published in the Financial Accounts. Figure B3 shows the time evolution over 
time of the debt ratio of the NFCs in each of the countries. ?
?
?
? ?
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
31??As forecasts of nominal GDP growth rates we used expectations of both the long-term real GDP growth and the long-
term Consumer Price Index inflation according to the Consensus Economics Forecasts.?
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Figure B3. Corporate Debt / Total Liabilities, ?? (%) 
?
US corporations finance their assets with a smaller proportion of debt and larger 
proportion of equity than corporations in the euro area. In the average sample period, German, 
Spanish and Italian corporations financed their assets practically with the same proportion of 
debt as equity. The average debt ratio of the French corporations was 44% and that of the US 
corporations 39%. The leverage ratios showed ups and downs throughout the period, 
including the 20 pp increase in the debt ratio of Spanish corporations from 1999 to 2008, and 
the 15 pp deleveraging of these corporations from 2008 to 2016.  
Depreciation rates and tax adjustment factors 
The annual depreciation rates ?? are calculated as the ratio of the fixed capital consumption 
reported in Sector National Accounts for the non-financial corporate sector of the respective 
country in year t to the stock of capital at the end of year t, ????. Depreciation rates, on 
average for the sample period, are 9.6% for France, 8.2% for Germany, 8.1% for Italy, 7.0% for 
Spain and 9.0% for the US. 
The adjusted-tax user cost of capital accounts for the taxation on corporate profits, 
as interest payments on debt finance and amortisation of invested capital are considered as 
expenses totally and partially deducted from the corporate tax base, respectively. For each 
country and over time, data on corporate income taxes are from the OECD and calculations 
on the net present values (NPV) of depreciation allowances are obtained directly from the US 
Tax Foundation.32 The NPV of depreciation allowances represents the percent of one dollar 
of a capital investment that can be recovered through the tax code. We aggregate the 
information available for the NPV of depreciation allowances for three kinds of assets (non-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
32??Data on corporate income taxes have been obtained from the OECD Tax Database available at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm. We take as the corporate income tax for each country the basic 
combined central and sub-central (statutory) corporate income tax rate given by the adjusted central government rate 
plus the sub-central rate. The adjusted central government rate takes into account surtaxes (if any) and interactions 
between central and sub-central taxation where tax at one level is deductible from the tax base of the other. 
Calculations of the NPV of depreciation allowances for each country over time are available at 
https://taxfoundation.org. These data are generally available from 1979 up to 2012 and are in turn calculations based 
on parameters from the CBT Tax Database collected by the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, assuming 
additionally an interest rate of 5% and an inflation rate of 2.5% across all countries and years. According to the CBT 
Tax Database, the parameters for the calculation of capital allowances do no change after 2012 for our countries of 
interest (Spain is the only exception but changes tend to revert over time to their previous values).?
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residential buildings, equipment and intangibles) using as weights the time-varying 
composition of nominal GFCF.  
The most relevant factors explaining the fall of the unit user cost of capital during the 
sample period were the funding costs (both, equity and debt) and the depreciation rate. By 
contrast, corporate tax variables and expected inflation had a marginal contribution.  
?
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Appendix C. Industry level analysis 
This appendix complements the robustness check presented in Section 7 of the main text. In 
particular we present the detailed results of the test of constant returns to scale with 2-digit 
sector level data taken from the CompNet database. This is a database of output and inputs 
for around 60 2-digit NACE sectors, available for France, Germany, Italy and Spain.?? We 
postulate a standard Cobb-Douglas production function (with variables in logs) where output is 
the gross value added of the NACE sector s in year t, ????, and the two inputs are labour, ???? , 
and estimated stock of capital, ????: 
???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ???? ? ???? ?? ? ? ??????????????(C1) 
where ????, ???? and ???? are all observed. ?? and ?? are, respectively, the elasticity of 
output to labour and capital inputs. By contrast, there are two unobserved components, ???? 
and ????. The first represents shocks to production or productivity that corporations are unable 
to predict before making their input decisions at t, so ?????????????? ? ??, where ???? is the 
information set at t of the representative firm of the sector s. However, the term ???? can be 
potentially predictable by firms, as long as it represents factors such as experience and skills of 
the firm’s managers and of their business conditions. 
The identification or bias problem arises here when we estimate ?? and ?? by ordinary 
least squares, as it is likely that a representative firm decides on its labour input ???? after or 
during the period in which it is unobservable ???? is becoming partially observed. This case is 
unlikely to occur when the representative company of the sector s decides on its stock of 
capital ?????since this is a time-to-build process (i.e. the level of capital stock in period t is 
decided at period t-1, because new capital needs more time to be installed and operational). 
Therefore, there could potentially be a correlation between ???? and  ???? that affects the 
estimation of ?? and ??. 
The parameters of the production function were estimated adopting the approach of 
several methodologies proposed to correct for this simultaneity bias: Olley and Pakes (OP, 
1996), Levinsohn and Petrin (LP, 2003), Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer correction to OP and LP 
(ACF, 2015), Robinson (R, 1988), Wooldridge (W, 2009), and Mollisi and Rovigatti (MR, 2017). 
According to these methodologies a proxy variable is used to recover the productivity shock 
???? (unobserved technical efficiency parameter), either the levels of investment (OP, 1996) or, 
in order to address the issue of zero values in investment data, the levels of intermediate 
consumption (LP, 2003). We also use as a proxy variable the ratio of investment over capital 
stock. Ensuring this invertibility of the proxy variable to be used in the technical efficiency shock 
???? requires imposing the condition that the proxy variable be strictly monotone in ??????So, 
assuming the decision by a firm representative of a given sector s about its proxy ???? ?
??????????? is given by ???? ? ???????? ?????, we can invert the investment policy function ???? 
or the intermediate consumption demand ???? such that we get 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
33??Data from CompNet for Germany, Italy and Spain come from the full sample of firms meaning all firm sizes. For France, 
only data on companies with more than 20 employees are available. The sample periods are the following: 2001-2012 
for France, 2000-2012 for Germany, 2001-2013 for Italy, and 1995-2013 for Spain. The information used is data about 
three descriptive statistics –mean, (output) weighted-mean, and median- across firms for each sector on turnover (total 
sales), gross value added, intermediate inputs (materials), labour (number of full-time equivalent employees), stock of 
capital, gross investment and investment ratio over capital, (all variables in real terms). To save space, in Table C1 we 
only show estimates coming from the information on weighted-mean statistics, although it should be mentioned that 
estimates based on the mean and median yield similar results for the returns to scale parameter and that the null 
hypothesis of constant returns to scale continues not to be rejected in most cases. 
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???? ? ?????????? ??????? ? ? ? ? ? ???????????????(C2) 
and this way we can express the productivity shock as a partially identified function of 
observables. 
If we substitute expression (C2) into the production function (C1) and, to simplify this 
complex and dynamic optimisation problem,?? treat it as a non-parametric function together 
with ?? and ??????, such that 
???????? ????? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ?????                (C3) 
we obtain 
???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ????? ? ???? ? ?????? ?
???????? ????? ? ???? ???????????? ? ? ? ? ? ???????????????(C4) 
Production function estimations à la OP (1996) and à la LP (2003) proceed in two 
stages. First, they use equation (C4) to form the first stage moment condition given by: 
?????????????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ???????? ????????????? ? ?? ???????????????(C5) 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimates of ???  and ???????? ????? can be 
derived from equation (C5). As mentioned, a polynomial approximation to the last term can 
be used. 
Equally important in these estimation approaches is the assumption that the 
unobserved productivity shock ???? follows a first-order Markov process in order to exploit the 
second moment condition, i.e. the capital stock ???? and the lagged labour input ????????? ? ?? 
are uncorrelated with ????, which will allow us to estimate the output elasticity to labour and 
capital, ??  and ??. That is, we can decompose ???? into its conditional expectation at period 
t-1, and an innovation term: 
???? ? ???????????????? ? ???? ? ????????? ?????? ? ????? ? ????????? ? ?????(C6)?
where ???????????????? ? ?. Substituting equation (C6) into (C1) renders 
???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ???? ? ???? ? ? ???????????????(C7)?
and from equation (C2) and (C3) we have  
?????? ? ?????? ???????? ??????? ? ???????????? ??????? ? ?? ? ?????????????(C8) 
So, substituting (C8) into (C7) yields 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
34??Solving for f and thus for f -1 would require additional assumptions and calculations, such as assumptions about the 
firm’s demand conditions and changes in input prices, rather than merely treating f -1 as a non-parametric function. In 
particular, f -1 could be approximated as an n-th order polynomial in the state variable (capital stock) and the proxy 
(intermediate input or investment variables). 
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???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????????????? ??????? ? ?? ? ????????? ?
???? ? ??????????? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ???????????(C9) 
The second moment condition is obtained from equation (C9). Remember that from 
(C6) and (C1) we assume that ???????????????? ? ? and ?????????????? ? ?, respectively. Thus, 
the second stage of the estimation techniques in OP (1996) and LP (2003) uses the following 
moment condition:35 
??????? ? ?????????????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?
?????????????? ??????? ? ?? ? ??????????????????? ? ?? ? ? ????????????(C10) 
where the first step estimates ???  and ???????? ????? from the first moment condition 
(C5) are substituted into the formula. The solution of the second moment condition (C10) gives 
estimates ?? ? ???? ??? ? ???. 
ACF (2015) suggested a modification to the OP (1996) and LP (2003) function 
production estimation methods in an attempt to mitigate the problem of functional dependence 
between the labour demand and other regressors that cause the first stage moment condition 
not to identify accurately the labour coefficient ??. ACF (2015) argue that OP-LP-based 
techniques can produce unrealistic estimates of ?? in many industries. This approach rests on 
the two moment conditions seen above, (C5) and (C10), with slight differences. The main 
difference between ACF (2015) and OP (1996) and LP (2003) is that the first methodology 
inverts the conditional rather than unconditional proxy demand equation to control for an 
unobserved productivity shock ????, so that ????? ? ???????? ????? ????? where ???? ?
???????????. This assumption implies that ???? is chosen after ???? instead of assuming that 
they are chosen simultaneously given the pair of state variables???????? ?????, which is the 
definition of the unconditional proxy demand equation. This way ???? can be treated as a state 
variable decided between periods t-1 and t and has dynamic implications in the sense that not 
only affects current but also future profits of the representative firm. From these new 
assumptions, that based on the strict monotonicity condition implying that ???? ?
???????? ????? ????? is strictly increasing in ???? and assuming a first-order Markov process for 
????, the derivation to obtain the moment conditions follows as before. First, proxy demand is 
inverted to obtain ???? ? ?????????? ????? ????? and this term is substituted into the production 
function (C1), such that 
???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ????? ????? ? ???? ?
???????? ????? ????? ? ???? ??????????? ? ? ? ? ? ????????????(C11) 
where ???????? ????? ????? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ????? ????? can be 
approximated by an n-order polynomial in ?????? ????? ?????. Since ???? is a non-parametric 
function in ?????? ????? ????? and none of the parameters ???? ??? ??? can be identified, the first 
moment condition is given by 
?????????????? ? ?????? ? ???????? ????? ????????????? ? ?? ? ????????????(C12) 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
35??For simplicity in the exposition of these very similar methodologies, we have overlooked the fact that in LP (2003) 
material or intermediate consumption ???? enters as input in the production function. Hence, the second step moment 
condition in LP (2003) is given by ??????? ? ?????????????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?
????????????????????? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ??????????????????? ? ?, from which estimates ???, ??? and ???. are 
obtained Before that, the estimate of ??, ??? (and the estimate of ???????????????????? ??????? ?) is calculated from the 
first stage moment condition ?????????????? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ???????? ????????????? ? ?, where ????????????? ?
?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????????? ?????.?
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So, unlike in (C5), ?? cannot be estimated in (C12). By contrast, this first stage yields 
estimates of ???????? ????? ?????, ????????? ????? ???????? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ?? ?? ? ? ? that can be 
plugged into the second moment 
??????? ? ?????????????? ? ?????? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ?
?????????????? ??????? ??????? ? ?? ? ???????? ? ??????????????????? ? ?                 (C13) 
replacing ???????????? ??????? ??????? by ????????????? ??????? ???????. This 
moment condition is similar to (C10), although the labour term is nested inside the g function as 
it is already present in ?????? ?. As (C13) involves an estimation of an additional parameter 
with respect to (C10), namely the parameter ??, ACF (2015) rely on a further condition in the 
second stage estimation. Assuming that labour is chosen after period t-1, ???? will correlate 
with ???? but ?????? will not.36 Thus, lagged labour (or other lagged inputs) can be used as 
instrument to keep the model exactly identified and to estimate all the parameters of the 
production function ? ? ???? ??? ???. Transforming conditional second stage equation (A14) 
into an unconditional one, according to ACF(2015) 
? ????? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????????????? ??????? ??????? ? ?? ?
???????? ? ?????????? ?
?
??????
????
?? ? ?? ? ? ? ? ????????????(C14) 
where ?????? ? is replaced by its estimate from the first stage, ??????? ?. 
Wooldridge (2009) proposes an alternative to the OP (1996) and LP (2003) methods that 
involves minimising the first (C5) and second (C10) stage moments simultaneously, such that  
? ?
???????????
???? ? ????????????
?
? ? ?
???? ? ?????? ? ???????? ????????????
???? ? ?? ? ?????? ? ?????? ? ?????????????? ??????? ? ?? ? ??????????????????
? 
which is estimated by System-GMM. The main advantage of Wooldridge’s approach 
over OP (1996) and LP (2003) methodologies is that is more efficient, as the two moment 
conditions are jointly estimated and the resulting estimator does not suffer from the collinearity 
issue identified in OP (1996) and LP (2003). Note that the latter methodologies use these two 
moments sequentially, identifying ??  in a first attempt using partial information given by the first 
stage moment. 
Furthermore, in an attempt to deal with the issue of short panels, we employ MR 
(2017), as this Wooldridge-type estimation method streamlines the use of instruments 
introducing them à la Blundell-Bond. We also incorporate time dummies to isolate the effects of 
the business cycle across sectors (i.e. to control for cross-correlation among sectors in each 
period), and sector dummies to capture idiosyncratic fixed effects. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
36??One could use contemporaneous labour ???? instead of its lag ?????? as a natural instrument if it were decided by the 
firm at time t-1 (or before productivity shock ???? is beginning to materialise or being inferred by the firm). Even this is 
a strong assumption it can be plausible in the presence of important labour market rigidities such as high hiring or firing 
costs, excessive regulation. If this were the case, the estimates would be more accurate. 
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Following the production function estimation methodologies proposed by the above-
mentioned literature, we estimate the elasticity of output to labour and capital pooling around 
sixty 2-digit NACE sectors and years for each country; next, we test the null hypothesis that the 
sum of these elasticities is equal to one. The CompNet data is presented at the level of each 
sector’s representative firm, where the representative firm is the output-weighted mean value of 
the corresponding variable across all firms in the database.  
The results of the estimations including the p values from the tests of constant returns 
to scale are presented in Table C1 for each country. Notice that for the four countries there are 
more cases in which the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale is not rejected than cases 
in which it is rejected. Likewise, we find that estimates of the parameter of the returns to scale 
are consistent around values close to one across several estimation methodologies employing 
different assumptions, which is much more convincing than relying on one single method. 
Therefore, the constant returns to scale assumption appears a plausible one for the corporate 
sectors of the four countries. 
? ?
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Table C1. Estimates of output elasticity to labour and capital, and of returns to scale 
??????
??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?????
?????????????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
??????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???
?? ????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??
?????????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??
?????????????????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ???
???????
??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?????
?????????????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????????????????????? ???? ????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
??????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???
?? ????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??
?????????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??
?????????????????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ???
?????
??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?????
?????????????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
??????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
?? ????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??
?????????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??
?????????????????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ???
?????
??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?????
?????????????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
???????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
??????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???
?? ????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??
?????????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ?? ??? ?? ?? ??
?????????????????????? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ??? ???
???????????????
?????????????
????????????
???????????????
?????????????
????????????
???????????????
?????????????
????????????
???????????????
?????????????
????????????
Sources and notes: CompNet. The results reported are estimates from several production function approaches (from (1) to 
(9)) of output (GVA) elasticities to labour and capital, their sum (equal to the returns to scale parameter) and the p-value of 
the null hypothesis of constant returns to scale (= 1) obtained with data from 2-digit NACE sectors of CompNet (around 
60 sectors), for France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Data from Germany, Italy and Spain come from the full sample of firms, 
meaning all firm sizes. For France, only data on companies with more than 20 employees are available. The sample 
periods are the following: 2001-2012 for France, 1997-2012 for Germany, 2001-2013 for Italy, and 1995-2013 for Spain. 
The information exploited is data about the (output) weighted-mean across firms for each sector on turnover (total sales), 
gross value added, intermediate inputs (materials), labour (number of full-time equivalent employees), stock of capital, 
gross investment and investment ratio over capital, all variables in real terms. The function production methodologies 
follow: (1) and (2) Olley and Pakes (1996), OP, with investment in levels or as a ratio, respectively, to recover the 
productivity shock (unobserved technical efficiency parameter) in conjunction with the state variable (capital); (3) and (4) 
Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2015), ACF, correction to (1) and (2), respectively, in an attempt to mitigate the possible 
collinearity between labour input and other regressors; (5) Levinsohn and Petrin (2003), LP, with intermediate inputs 
instead of investment to overcome the empirical issue of zeroes in investment data; (6) ACF correction to (5); (7) Robinson 
(1988); (8) Wooldridge (2009), a more efficient estimator that does not suffer from the collinearity issue identified in OP and 
LP methodologies, and (9) Mollisi and Rovigatti (2017), in order to deal with short panels as it is introduced dynamic panel 
instruments à la Blundell-Bond. 
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Data Appendix: Value added and labor costs 
?
Sources and notes: The GVA is calculated according to the definition of the income statement in Section 4, i.e. includes subsidies net of taxes on production. The compensation per full-time equivalent (FTE) employee is calculated as the compensation 
of employees of the non-financial corporate sector reported in Sectoral National Accounts divided by the FTE employees. The number of FTE employees for each European country is constructed from EU Labor Force Survey data available on 
Eurostat. Data for the US are available on BEA (NIPA Tables, Section 6 – Income and employment by industry). For each country, we aggregate FTE employees’ series for each activity branch that is typical of NFCs. For each activity branch and 
year, the number of FTE employees is equal to the total number of employees times the average number of actual weekly hours for total employees divided by the average number of actual weekly hours for full-time employees. The total number of 
employees is the sum of the number of full-time employees and the number of part-time employees. 
?????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
?????????????????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
???????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ?????
????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
??????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
?????????????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ???????
???????????????????????????????????????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ????? ??????? ???????
????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
? ??? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ???? ????
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Data Appendix: Capital stock through Perpetual Inventory Method 
?
Sources and notes: Data from Sectoral National Accounts for NFCs in Europe come from Eurostat. Data for NFCs in the US come from BEA and it is considered corporate business and excluded noncorporate business. Series for 1995-1998 for 
NFCs in Spain are linked with those from Spanish Statistical Institute. The investment deflator for each country is constructed by aggregating sectors and investment components akin to NFCs from KLEMS for the nominal and real gross fixed capital 
formation (GFCF) available until 2015. The value of 2016 for the investment deflator, not available from KLEMS, is approximated by a weighted-average of the GFCF deflators of non-residential construction and civil engineering, equipment and other 
investment from AMECO, whose data provide very similar trends that those from KLEMS. The capital stock is constructed by the permanent inventory method. 
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Data Appendix: Determinants of the (pre-tax) user cost of capital 
?
Sources and notes: The debt cost is the interest rate on new loans to NFCs over five years from ECB data, except for nonfinancial corporates in the US for which is used the yield on Moody’s Aaa bond portfolio. The equity cost is the equity risk premium (dividend 
yield of the benchmark domestic stock exchange) plus a base rate (ten-year domestic sovereign bond yield). The capital cost is the debt cost and the equity cost weighted by the liability composition in the previous year of NFCs from Financial Accounts, whose 
data come from Eurostat for NFCs in Europe and from BEA for NFCs in the US. The initial value for the depreciation rate is obtained from a weighted-average of the depreciation rates across sectors and capital components akin to NFCs from KLEMS for each 
country. The weights are the nominal capital stocks across those sectors and capital components over the aggregate capital stock in 1995. The asset expected inflation is calculated as the five-year moving average of the realized annual growth rate of the 
investment deflator. Data on corporate income taxes come from the OECD Tax Database and calculations of the NPV of depreciation allowances for each country over time are derived from the US Tax Foundation and the Oxford University Centre for Business 
Taxation. We aggregate the information available for the NPV of depreciation allowances across capital assets using as weights the time-varying composition of nominal GFCF. 
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Data Appendix: Input Cost and Profit Shares 
?
?
?
Sources and notes: Data from Sectoral National Accounts for NFCs in Europe come from Eurostat. Data for NFCs in the US come from BEA and it is considered corporate business and excluded noncorporate business. Series for 1995-1998 for 
NFCs in Spain are linked with those from Spanish Statistical Institute. The capital stock is constructed by the permanent inventory method. The pre-tax user cost of capital is the sum of the liabilities-weighted capital cost plus the depreciation rate 
minus the asset expected inflation, taking into account the tax effects of deductible debt interest payments and amortisations of invested capital. The labor share is the compensation of employees divided by the GVA. The capital share is the capital 
payments (pre-tax user cost of capital times capital stock) divided by the GVA. The profit share is the proportion of the GVA after deducting the labor and capital shares. In the calculation of GVA we include subsidies net of production taxes. 
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